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Abstract 
 
It has been suggested that substance use transitions from a controlled to an automatic 
process (Tiffany, 1990).  In particular, smoking has been found to appear automatic 
(Baxter & Hinson, 2001).  Experienced smokers were able to attend to a reaction time 
task with minimal interference while smoking.  Novice smokers‟ performances were 
impaired when smoking.  These results were based on differences in mean reaction times 
using analysis of variance.  Another analytic approach to test the hypothesis that smoking 
is an automatic process is through the use of capacity coefficients and ratios.  These 
mathematical tools allow for the direct testing of mental processing.  The goal of the 
current study was to use these capacity measures to investigate whether smoking taxed 
capacity, and whether results from this type of analysis differed from a traditional 
ANOVA.  Also, capacity ratios were compared between smokers with different patterns 
of alcohol and cigarette co-use.  There is a well established relationship between alcohol 
and cigarette use, and alcohol use itself may have an impact on smoking behaviour.  
Capacity ratios indicated that smoking does tax capacity, even in daily smokers.  It was 
also found through the use of a pseudosmoking condition, in which the smoking 
behaviour had to be ceased partway, that the inhalation of smoke seems to require its own 
cognitive processing.  When these results were compared to a traditional ANOVA, it was 
found that measures of capacity provided additional information.   When smokers were 
grouped based on cigarette and alcohol co-use, results supported the hypothesis that 
smokers who frequently coupled cigarettes and alcohol were impaired in processing in 
comparison to less frequent couplers.  
 
Keywords: smoking, automatic processing, capacity,   
iv 
 
 
Table of Contents 
CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION............................................................................ii 
Abstract...............................................................................................................................iii 
Table of Contents.................................................................................................................iv 
List of Tables........................................................................................................................vi 
List of Figures.....................................................................................................................vii 
Introduction..........................................................................................................................1 
Automatic and Controlled Processing..............................................5   
Empirical Evidence for the Controlled vs. Automatic Distinction..7  
Testing Whether Substance Use is an Automatic Process……......11  
Dual Task Paradigms………………...............…...........................14 
Information Processing Models…………..…...........................….17 
Response Times in the Study of Information Processing..........….20 
Smoking as an Automatic Process and Capacity……………....... 26 
Calculating Capacity Ratios and Coefficients.....................................................…….…29 
         Analysis 1…………...…………………………..........................…………………….…33 
Method  
  Participants………………………………………………………..34 
  Measures……………………………………………………….….34 
  Task…………………………………………………………….…36 
Results 
  Smoking Groups………………………………………………..…38 
  Reaction Time Data…………………………………………….....40 
  Capacity Ratios…………………………………………………....41 
  General Capacity Coefficients……………....…………………….52 
Discussion………………………………………………………....58 
         Analysis 2…………………………………………………….......................………….63 
Method……………………………………………………………......64 
Results……………………………………………………………..….65 
Discussion………………………………………………………….....73 
v 
 
Analysis 3………………………………………………………...............................76 
Method………………………………………………………………..78 
Results………………………………………………………………...78 
Discussion…………………………………………………………….89 
General Discussion……………………………………………….......................…….....94 
  Awareness of Automatic Behaviour......................................................96 
  Capacity and Smoking Groups..............................................................97 
  Treatment Implications..........................................................................100 
  Mathematical Modeling in Clinical Science..........................................102 
  Future Research......................................................................................102 
References........................................................................................................................106 
Appendix A......................................................................................................................114 
Appendix B......................................................................................................................115 
Curriculum Vitae.............................................................................................................180 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Smoking Group Descriptives......................39 
Table 2:  Coefficient Alpha Calculation for Smoking Groups X Bins.............................42 
Table 3: Mean and Standard Deviations of Reaction Times for All Smoking Groups.....66 
Table 4: F Values for Smoking Group X Smoking Condition Interactions......................68  
Table 5: Significant Q-values for Simple Main Effects....................................................71 
Table 6: Mean Number and Standard Deviation of Co-Use Days for  
All Smoking Groups..........................................................................................................79 
Table 7: Number and Proportion of Low and High Cigarette and Alcohol Co-Users 
Among Smoking Groups...................................................................................................81 
  
vii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Example of a Probability Density Function.......................................................21 
Figure 2: Example of a Cumulative Probability Distribution Function.............................23 
Figure 3: Stimulus Configurations.....................................................................................30 
Figure 4: Capacity Ratios for XX Configuration...............................................................43 
Figure 5:  Capacity Ratios for X_ Configuration...............................................................44 
Figure 6: Capacity Ratios for _X Configuration................................................................45  
Figure 7: Capacity Ratios for XO Configuration...............................................................46  
Figure 8: Capacity Ratios for OX Configuration...............................................................47  
Figure 9: Capacity Ratios for OO Configuration...............................................................48 
Figure 10: Capacity Ratios for O_ Configuration..............................................................49  
Figure 11: Capacity Ratios for _O Configuration..............................................................50  
Figure 12: AND and OR Coefficients for Complete Sample............................................53 
Figure 13: OR Coefficient (standard formula).................................................................55 
Figure 14: OR Coefficient (alternate formula).................................................................56 
Figure 15: AND Coefficient.............................................................................................57 
Figure 16: Smoking Group by Condition Interaction........................................................69 
Figure 17: Capacity Ratios for XX Configuration.............................................................82 
Figure 18:  Capacity Ratios for X_ Configuration.............................................................83  
Figure 19: Capacity Ratios for _X Configuration..............................................................84  
Figure 20: Capacity Ratios for XO Configuration.............................................................85  
Figure 21: Capacity Ratios for OX Configuration.............................................................86 
Figure 22: Capacity Ratios for O_ Configuration..............................................................87  
Figure 23: Capacity Ratios for _O Configuration..............................................................88  
 
 
 
  
  
1 
 
 
Tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, and hallucinogens are only 
a few of the psychoactive substances that people use in order to alter their experiences 
and consciousness (Jung, 2001).  Reasons for the use of such substances are varied.  
People may use these substances to enhance positive feelings or to avoid negative 
feelings, because their peers use them or due to boredom.  In addition to the reasons 
promoting the use of such substances, there are reasons that should dissuade people from 
using them.  All substances have possible negative effects.  These effects may be 
physiological, emotional, social, financial, or any combination of these.  Yet, people 
continue to use substances despite the possible consequences.  Some people continue to 
smoke tobacco after suffering heart attacks and strokes.  Despite the risk of contracting 
HIV or hepatitis C, people share needles to inject themselves with drugs.  Others go into 
debt to purchase substances.  The fact that dire consequences do not dissuade people 
from using substances is puzzling.   
 
One of the primary goals of substance use research is to understand the reasons why 
people use and abuse substances, despite the numerous negative effects that can occur 
because of substance use.  A better understanding of these causes may lead to better 
treatment of substance use problems.   Some of the factors involved in substance use that 
have been studied are the physiological effects that maintain substance use, the emotional 
factors involved in substance use, and how substance use interacts with other aspects in a 
person‟s life.  However, despite all of the knowledge in the area of substance, there 
remain numerous unexplained aspects involved in substance use. 
 
It is unlikely that one area of research will be able to comprehensively explain why 
people use psychoactive drugs.  Substance use is multi-faceted, with many factors 
interacting with one another.  While it is important to understand the immediate 
physiological effects of these drugs, these effects do not explain why someone is 
compelled to try the substance in the first place.  Identifying risk factors, such as parental 
and peer drug use, does not explain why substance abuse may remain a problem when 
these influences are no longer present in an individual‟s life. While it is important to 
understand all of these contributing factors, it is clear that the search for reasons for the 
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initiation and continuance of substance use needs to be expanded.  The role of cognitive 
factors in substance use has been a recent focus of study (McCusker, 2001).   
  
Cognition is defined as the acquisition, storage, transformation and use of knowledge 
(Matlin, 1998).  One way of conceptualizing cognition is the distinction between explicit 
and implicit.  Explicit cognition involves the processes that we have awareness of, such 
as decision- making, purposively paying attention to a task, and manipulating information 
(e.g. adding or subtracting numbers).  Arguably, most individuals have at least some 
explicit knowledge about various substances and their effects.  People likely know that 
drinking alcohol may lead to intoxication.  They may know that certain substances are 
illegal.  They may use this knowledge in deciding whether to use a substance.  Explicit 
cognition likely plays a role in the initial decision to try a substance, in that people weigh 
the reasons for and against its use. 
 
The other type of cognition is implicit.  Implicit cognitive processes have been defined as 
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that 
mediate feeling, thought, or action” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  Individuals acquire 
knowledge without realizing it, and this knowledge impacts their behaviours.  It is 
possible that implicit cognitive processes are involved in substance use.  Most people 
have explicit knowledge about why they should not use substances.  If they were to 
weigh the reasons for using substances versus not using substances, it would seem that 
the scale should tip in favour against using these substances.  However, something drives 
people to use substances despite what seems to be a clear inequality of positive and 
negative reasons.  Implicit cognitive processes may be tipping the scale in favour of using 
these substances.  While the person cannot state why they continue to use substances that 
harm them, something continues to drive the substance use.  The recognition and 
identification of implicit cognitive processes may be important in the treatment of 
substance use problems.  Making people aware of these implicit processes may allow 
them to counteract them, and tip the scales in favour of ceasing substance use.   
 
One of the most common and difficult to treat addictive behaviours is the smoking of 
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tobacco.  Despite the detrimental health consequence of smoking, 18% of Canadians 
smoke cigarettes (Health Canada, 2009).  Quitting smoking is challenging, and even 
when quit attempts are successful, relapses are common (Balfour, 2004; Wetter et al., 
1999).   Cessation aids that target the physiological addiction to cigarettes, such as the 
nicotine patch, nicotine gum, and Champix, as well as behavioural treatments, have had 
only limited success (Hatsukami & Mooney, 1999). A combination of counselling and 
nicotine replacement therapy is more effective than counseling alone (Mojica et al., 
2004), however quit rates remain relatively low.  While there is a plethora of information 
available about the harmful health consequences attributable to smoking and the benefits 
of quitting, people continue to smoke.  This indicates a disconnect between “knowing” 
and “doing” within smokers.  While the explicit knowledge of the benefits of ceasing the 
behaviour are known, other factors continue to drive the smoking behaviour. 
 
Cognitive processes that are outside of smokers‟ awareness may be involved in smoking, 
given that many experienced smokers report that they do not even think about smoking.  
Smokers report that they find themselves smoking without even remembering lighting up, 
and that they light up cigarettes without realizing that they already have a lit one in the 
ashtray (Hudmon et al., 2003).  On a self-report measure of dependence, smokers 
positively endorse the item  “My smoking is automatic- I don‟t even think about it” 
(Johnson et al., 2005).   This lack of awareness is especially striking when considering 
the number of behavioural components that are involved in smoking. 
 
A smoker must first obtain a cigarette from a package, ensuring that the cigarette is not 
broken in the process.  The next step would be to place the cigarette in their mouth, 
which involves raising the cigarette to the mouth, slightly opening the mouth, placing the 
cigarette in the mouth, and then closing the mouth.  Then the smoker must light the 
cigarette, which involves bringing an igniting source to the cigarette, draw in on the 
cigarette, and take the igniting source away from the mouth, making sure that they do not 
burn themselves in the process.  The source of ignition may be a lighter or match. Each of 
these have their own behavioral components such as disengaging a child lock on a 
lighter, or pulling a match out of a matchbook. 
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Once the cigarette is lit, only then can the administration of nicotine begin, which entails 
inhaling smoke from the cigarette, drawing the smoke into the lungs, exhaling the smoke, 
and bringing the cigarette to and from the mouth, while shaking the burned tobacco off 
the cigarette at times that the smoker judges appropriate.  On each inhale, the smoker 
must judge the optimal amount of smoke to inhale, hold it within the lungs for a certain 
period of time, and then exhale the smoke. The smoker must monitor the amount of the 
cigarette remaining to be smoked, so that the filter is not burned.   The cigarette then 
must be discarded, which may involve extinguishing it and tossing it away.   
 
Given the complexities of the behaviours needed to smoke a cigarette, it seems 
reasonable to assume that there must be some cognitive mechanisms underlying all of 
these behavioural components.  Initially, either an explicit or implicit cognitive process 
needs to occur for the smoking behaviour to be initiated.  Then, some degree of attention, 
another cognitive process, likely needs to be  allotted to the pacing of moving the 
cigarette up to and away from the mouth, and also to ensure that one does not burn 
themselves.  So while smoking is an overt observable behaviour, there are numerous 
cognitive processes underlying these behaviours.   
 
In spite of the seeming complexity of smoking, experienced smokers perform a variety of 
other activities while smoking cigarettes. An experienced smoker may drive a car, read, 
or have a conversation, all while smoking.  It appears that smoking is effortless.  
However, this level of ease is not present when a novice smoker first attempts these 
behaviours.  The level of coordination needed to smoke is apparent when watching a 
novice smoker experiment with their first cigarette.  This initial experimentation with 
smoking is usually accompanied by problems in lighting the cigarette, difficulties in 
pacing the inhalation and exhalation of smoke, or choking on the smoke.   
 
Given that smoking arguably appears to be a cognitively consuming task, with intricate 
behavioural components, what enables an experienced smoker to smoke without any self-
reported realization?  How can an experienced smoker do other complicated tasks, such 
as drive a car, while smoking?  These issues may be explained in the context of implicit 
5 
 
 
cognitive processes.  Initially, the novice smoker may use explicit mechanisms to make 
the decision to have a cigarette and to deliberately attend to the components of the 
process. Over time, this may shift to an implicit process.  The smoker no longer needs to 
actively decide to smoke or to pay attention to their smoking actions, and this frees the 
smoker to do other things while smoking.  The smoking appears to occur 
“automatically”.   
 
Automatic and Controlled Processing 
 
It has been argued that repeated substance use may transition from an initially controlled 
process to an automatic one (Tiffany, 1990).  Broadly defined, controlled processes are 
those that require effort, attention, and awareness.  Automatic processes are those that 
occur without awareness, attention or effort on the part of the actor.  The initiation of 
substance use, such as smoking, is qualitatively different from use after many repetitions.  
This can be observed in the differences in smoking behaviour between a novice smoker 
and an experienced smoker.  The speed, apparent ease, and need for attention of the 
smoker vary between the novice and the experienced smoker.  This transition occurs after 
repeated practice.  Tiffany argues that this difference in behaviour is explained by the 
shift from controlled to automatic processing. 
 
Repetition of a cognitive or motor task under similar conditions results in the 
development of a skilled behaviour that is qualitatively different from when the 
behaviour was initially performed (Tiffany, 1990).  Tiffany argues that this transition 
from controlled to automatic behaviour occurs in substance use.  Behaviours, such as 
cigarette smoking, involve numerous components, such as taking the cigarette out of its 
package, placing it in the mouth, lighting the cigarette, and inhaling.  All of these steps 
within the behaviour are repeatedly practiced.  The processes are eventually stored in 
memory as action schemata (Schmidt, 1975; Shallice, 1972) or action plans (Allport, 
1980; Newell, 1978).  Automatic action schemas involve stimulus configurations, 
procedures, action sequences, alternative action sequences, and physiology (Tiffany, 
1990).   
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The stimulus configurations may be external or internal events needed for the automatic 
process to be initiated (Tiffany, 1990).  These may include environmental locations, time 
of day, or physical and mood states.  Procedures include all of the actions that comprise 
the schemata.  Action sequences coordinate all of the separate behaviours into one 
behaviour sequence.  As mentioned above, smoking behaviour is comprised of various 
steps.  The action sequence encompasses all of these behaviours.  Alternative action 
sequences include contingency plans in the event that there are unexpected environmental 
conditions.  Tiffany (1990) also outlines two physiological components of action 
schemata, support physiology for action components and physiological adjustment in 
anticipation of drug intake.   
 
In order for these substance use action plans to develop, several conditions must be 
present.  The first component is the availability of the drug.  If obtaining the drug requires 
extensive planning, then this will most likely remain a controlled process.  However, this 
does not prevent the administration of the drug from becoming automatic. Another 
component that affects the automatization of drug use behavior is environmental factors 
that may affect use.  In the example of smoking, non-smoking legislation severely 
restricts the rights of smokers.  Most public places prohibit smoking.  This needs to be 
incorporated into the action plan, i.e., need to go outside to have a cigarette.   
 
Lastly, Tiffany (1990) argues that characteristics of the drugs themselves may affect the 
development of action plans.  Many drugs have inherent reinforcing properties.  The 
administration of nicotine leads to the release of dopamine, norepinephrine and beta-
endorphins.  Tiffany argues that these positively reinforcing properties of certain drugs 
may promote more rapid development of coherent and integrated drug-use action 
schemata.  He does acknowledge that this is purely speculative and that limited research 
has been conducted on the effect of reinforcing properties in the development of any 
automatic behaviour. 
Tiffany (1990) illustrates the concept of the transition of controlled processing to 
automatic with the analogy of learning to drive a car.  An inexperienced driver initially 
must devote conscious attention to all of the tasks involved in driving a car.  They must 
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pay attention to which pedal to press, which way to adjust the indicator, how much they 
need to turn the steering wheel, and a number of other behaviours.  With practice, the 
driver becomes accustomed to all of the steps required to drive the car.  Eventually, the 
process becomes so automatic that the driver is able to direct his or her attention to other 
tasks such as changing radio stations or having a conversation, with little or no detriment 
to the driving itself.  Of course, driving a car still entails some elements of attention.  
There is relative agreement that automatic vs. controlled processing is not an all-or-none 
phenomena (Moors & DeHouwer, 2006).  Most processes involve a combination of both 
automatic and controlled processing, but distinctions may be made between the two. 
 
It has been suggested that automatic processes are autonomous, unintentional, 
uncontrollable, purely stimulus driven and unconscious.  Moors and DeHouwer (2006) 
have suggested that each feature of automaticity should be investigated individually.  
This approach would allow identification of those features that are present across all 
types of automatic processes.  For example, autonomy has been suggested as the minimal 
criterion for all automatic processes (Bargh, 1992).  Once an automatic process has been 
started, there is no need for conscious guidance or monitoring for it to be completed.  
However, there may be other features that are only present in certain types of automatic 
processes.  Substance use may have unique components of automaticity, which are not 
present in other types of automatic processes.  There may be differences in automatic 
features across different type of substances.  Taking a features approach in the study of 
automatic processing allows us to be more precise in our definition, and empirical testing, 
of these concepts.   
 
Empirical Evidence for the Controlled vs. Automatic Distinction 
 
The historical roots of the empirical distinction between automatic and controlled 
processing come from cognitive psychology.  Researchers initially focused on the 
apparent automaticity of cognitive processing.  For example, Schneider and Shiffrin 
(1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) used an adapted Sternberg (1966) task to test whether 
repeated practice changes the processing of a visual stimulus.  During the Sternberg task, 
8 
 
 
participants must decide whether a current visual target was included in an original 
memory set of items.  For example, a participant may initially see the memory set “F T R 
K”.  They would then be shown a number of visual targets, and asked to indicate whether 
each target had been in the original memory set.  Stimulus items that were included in the 
original sets were considered targets (e.g., the letter “F”), while items that were not in the 
original set were considered distracters (e.g. the letter “A”).  After a number of trials with 
one memory set, participants would learn a new memory set of items and repeat the task.  
For example, the new set could be “L O Q A”.  Shiffrin and  Schneider (1977; Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977) tested whether processing the stimulus item differed under two 
conditions; consistent and varied mapping. 
 
Consistent mapping occurs when the target and distracter stimuli are consistent across the 
memory sets, e.g. the letter “F” would only be a target, and never a distracter.  It was 
hypothesized that this type of mapping would eventually lead to “automatic” processing 
of the set.  Initially, participants would need to compare the target stimulus to each item 
in the original memory set and decide whether it was a target or a distracter.  If the initial 
set was “N R W F”, and the stimulus was “F”, the participant would need to recall all 
four items in the set to determine whether an “F” had been present.  The next memory set 
may be “Q F H J” where F is again a target.  Over conditions, determining that “F” is a 
target would arguably become quicker, easier, and require less attention.  When one saw 
the letter “F”, they would automatically know that this was a target.  The recall of all 
original items is no longer required since it is now automatic that “F” is a target.   
 
Varied mapping occurs when stimuli can both be targets and distracters across 
conditions.  For example, in the first condition the memory set may be “K L U F”.  In that 
case, “F” is a target.  In the next condition, the set could be “P Q W X”, so that “F” is 
now a distracter.  The participant must continually compare the target to the original set.  
Under these conditions, the processing of the target is deemed to be slow, effortful and 
requires attention.  Practice should not have much effect on processing speed, as the 
status of each stimulus item continuously changes. 
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In a series of experiments using the adapted Sternberg task, Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) showed there were distinct differences in performance 
between the consistent and varied mapping conditions.  Processing was much quicker in 
the consistent mapping condition than in the varied mapping condition.  Participants were 
faster to respond in the consistent mapping condition whether the stimulus item was a 
distracter or a target.  Shiffrin and  Schneider argued that the cognitive process had 
become more automatic in the consistent mapping condition.  Processing remained 
controlled in the varied mapping condition.  This provided evidence that one of the 
features of automatic processing is enhanced speed. 
 
In further experiments using the Sternberg task, Schneider and Schiffrin (1977; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977) manipulated the number of items, up to a maximum of six, in the 
original set.  They found that the number of items in the original item set had no effect on 
performance in the consistent mapping conditions.  Performance was the same, regardless 
if the original memory set had 4 items or 6 items.  The number of items in the memory 
set in the varied mapping condition impacted performance dramatically.  In the varied 
mapping condition there were increases in reaction time as the number of items in the 
memory set increased.   The lack of variation in performance despite increases in the 
number of items in the memory set in the consistent mapping conditions was argued to be 
evidence of the efficiency of automatic processing.  An automatic process is not impeded 
by changes in the load of items to process. 
 
The transition from controlled to automatic processing is argued to occur as a function of 
practice.  Schneider (1985) outlined four phases that occur when a process shifts from 
controlled to automatic processing.  Controlled processing is the first phase.  Performance 
is slow, serial and effortful. It is also greatly impacted by increases in memory or 
processing loading.  The second phase occurs after consistent practice.  The amount of 
practice required for this shift may vary across tasks.  A mix of both controlled and 
automatic processes characterizes this stage.  Phase three is classified as automatic 
processing with controlled-processing assist.  Although individuals may occasionally 
attend to the task they are doing, the need for full attention is greatly decreased.  The final 
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phase in the transition is full automatic processing.   
 
Schneider (1985) illustrated this model using a category-search experiment.  The 
participant was presented with a short list of categories, such as Animal and Tree.  They 
were then shown words that may or may not be members of the previously shown 
categories.  The task involved the participant responding with a motor response, 
indicating whether the target words are members of one of the categories.  In the first 
phase, controlled processing, the participant has many tasks to complete.  They first have 
to remember the categories initially presented to them (e.g., Tree and Animal).  This is 
considered the semantic vector within the model.  They are shown target words (e.g. Cat 
and Car), which is the visual vector.  They must then make a response, which is the motor 
vector.   
 
The semantic vector is preloaded with the names of the categories.  The number of 
categories presented to the participant will affect the speed of the process.  This is 
considered the effect of memory loading.  When the target words are displayed, this 
activates the visual vector.  The number of words that are presented will affect the speed 
of the process.  A greater number of words presented will slow the processing speed. 
Once the words are presented, this will activate the memory unit for the categories shown 
previously.  The information presented visually is then processed through the semantic 
criteria (i.e. is one of these words part of a previously seen category?).  Once a decision 
has been made, a motor response must be made.  This activates the motor vector.  There 
are numerous steps within the model.  When this task is first presented, processing will 
be very effortful, slow, and controlled. 
 
The second phase in Schneider‟s model is defined as the co-occurrence of controlled and 
automatic processing.  Once the target word is shown, a motor response will be 
associatively evoked.  There is still the need for controlled processing of the early stages 
of the task (seeing the categories, remembering them, seeing the target word, making a 
decision), but the response to the task becomes more automatic (learning that the index 
finger is “yes” and middle finger is “no”).  During the third phase, there is a shift to 
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automatic processing with controlled-processing assist.  The subject attends to the task in 
general, rather than each step separately.  The participant may generally do the task 
automatically for the majority of words, but switch to controlled processing for a subset 
of less common words. For example, the response may be automatically “yes” if the 
category is Animals and the target word is Cat. However, there may be a delay in 
response if the word is something novel, such as Marsupial.   The final phase is automatic 
processing.  Schneider notes that there is no clear transition between phase 3 and 4.   
 
Automaticity occurs in a series of phases.  It is only through repetition and practice that a 
task becomes automatic.  A complex series of decisions and behaviours occur with 
greater ease and effortlessness over time.   Does this transition occur with substance use?  
Is the development of substance use even comparable to these traditional cognitive tasks? 
 
Testing Whether Substance Use is an Automatic Process 
 
It has been suggested that substance use may be conceptualized as an automatic process.  
Characteristics of automatic processing, such as speed, autonomy, a lack of control, 
effortlessness and a lack of conscious awareness have been described as characteristics of 
substance use (Tiffany, 1990).  There does appear to be a qualitative difference in the 
smoking of novice and experienced smokers. Experienced smokers themselves identify 
their smoking as automatic (Johnson et al., 2005).  However, many issues need to be 
considered before deciding whether smoking, or any other substance use, is an automatic 
process. 
 
The first issue is defining automaticity.  As previously discussed, there is no consistent 
definition for automaticity (Moors & DeHouwer, 2006).  There is a need for both 
conceptual and empirical precision in the definition of automaticity. Developing a 
definition of automaticity may involve identifying features that are characteristic of 
automatic processes.  Much of what we do throughout the day appears to occur 
automatically, without our conscious awareness (Bargh & Chartran, 1999).  However, it 
is not enough to describe something as automatic simply because it appears to be so.  The 
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way in which automaticity is defined will have an impact on the experimental design 
when testing for automaticity.   
 
In addition to the definition of automaticity, testing substance use experimentally has its 
own set of challenges.  Many substance use behaviours are difficult to bring into a 
laboratory setting.  Situational factors that impact substance use, such as peer groups or 
the environment, are difficult to replicate in a laboratory. There are ethical constraints 
when conducting laboratory research.  Researchers must ensure participants‟ safety, and 
it is complicated to do so if administrating a substance that produces intoxicating or 
deleterious effects.  Many substances are illegal, which may be a challenge in both 
acquiring ethical approval to study and provide challenges in obtaining the substance 
itself. Potential participants may also be hesitant in participating in such research.  
Smoking is likely the easiest substance use behaviour to study in a laboratory setting 
given that smoking is legal, cigarettes are easily accessible, and arguably have minimal, if 
any, acute debilitating effects. 
 
There are some potential problematic issues in observing smoking in a laboratory setting.  
Most of the external factors that may influence smoking, such as seeing others smoke, 
eating, and environmental factors (Shiffman et al., 2002), are removed. One of the more 
salient co-activities that may have an effect on smoking is the use of alcohol. The 
relationship between cigarette and alcohol use among regular smokers is robust.  
Approximately 80-90% of smokers drink regularly, and smokers are heavier drinkers 
than non-smokers (Strine et al., 2005).  There is evidence that there is a pharmacological 
interaction between alcohol and cigarette consumption.  In laboratory studies, drinking 
increases the rate and amount of smoking (Mintz, Boyd, Rose, Charuvastra & Jarvik, 
1985), and transdermal nicotine administration increased alcohol consumption in men 
who smoked 1 to 10 cigarettes per day (Acheson, Mahler, Chi, & de Wit, 2006). 
 
There is also a relationship between light smoking and alcohol use.  Smokers who smoke 
2-8 cigarettes a day smoked a greater proportion of cigarettes in the presence of alcohol 
than those who smoked more than 10 cigarettes a day (Krukowski, Solomon, & Naud, 
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2005).  Ninety-four percent of those who smoke fewer than 5 cigarettes per day at least 5 
days a week (referred to as “chippers”), reported smoking while drinking alcohol 
(Shiffman, Kassel, Paty, Gnys, & Zettler-Segal, 1994a; Shiffman, Paty, Kassel, Gnys, & 
Zettler-Segal, 1994b).  Situations in which alcohol is consumed may be particularly prone 
to induce smoking in individuals who do not smoke on a regular basis.  Smokers who 
only or primarily smoke when using alcohol (high co-users) may be different from 
smokers who use cigarettes in a broad range of situations (low co-users), in terms of 
dependence levels, frequency and quantity of smoking. 
 
In addition to these differences between low and high co-users of alcohol and cigarettes, 
alcohol may have an impact on whether smoking becomes automatic.  There is a long 
history of research examining the effects of alcohol‟s influence on learning. Alcohol 
intoxication has been found to impact learning, particularly when information is shifted 
from short- to long-term storage (Weingartner & Faillace, 1971a, 1971b). This may 
impact the storage of all of the components of smoking behaviour. As described earlier, 
smoking does involve numerous behavioural components. While alcohol may not impact 
the initial learning of smoking behaviour, it may impact its transition to an automatic 
behaviour. 
 
Using multinomial processing tree models, Chechile (2010) investigated the impact of 
alcohol use on the storage and retrieval of information following acute alcohol ingestion. 
He found that alcohol use impairs the storage of new information, and suggested that 
alcohol impairs the initial quality of memory encoding. However, there were minimal 
differences in retrieval between alcohol and placebo use. Chechile, however, cautioned 
that these results should not be interpreted as evidence that alcohol never impacts 
retrieval, as the retrieval task was done shortly after learning the new information. These 
results may have differed if the time between learning and retrieval was increased, as is 
the case with smoking and alcohol. It is likely that there are relatively long lags between 
smoking opportunities.  
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Another consideration of the relationship between alcohol and cigarette use is state-
dependent learning. It has been found that information that is learned when intoxicated is 
more easily retrieved under intoxication in comparison to sober conditions (Goodwin, 
Powell, Bremer, Hoine, & Stern, 1969.; Weingartner, Adefris, Eich, & Murphy, 1976). If 
smoking behaviour is learned when using alcohol, then it may be more difficult to smoke 
in non-drinking circumstances.  
 
Dual Task Paradigms   
 
One of the primary methods of studying whether a behaviour or process has become 
automatic is the dual task paradigm.  This technique involves determining if there are 
limitations in performing two tasks at once.  Cognitive psychologists argue that humans 
are limited in their ability to do multiple tasks at once well (Band, Jolicoeur, Akyürek, & 
Memelink, 2006).  This difficulty may be a result of an inability to divide attention, a 
lack of capacity, or a deficiency of cognitive resources. Typically, performance on two 
concurrent tasks is decreased in comparison to attending to only one task at a time. 
However, the dual task paradigm has been used to investigate whether there are 
conditions under which this decrease in performance does not occur.  Typically, 
performance on a novel primary task is measured on its own and then with a concurrent 
secondary task. Performance is usually impaired on the primary task, with the 
introduction of the secondary task. The primary task is then extensively practiced, and the 
secondary task is reintroduced.  Following practice, performance on the primary task is 
no longer affected by the secondary task. It is hypothesized that the primary task has 
become automatic and attention can be diverted to the secondary task. 
 
While dual task paradigms are widely used, there are no standard formats for their use.  
The natures of the tasks vary substantially from study to study.   Some examples of dual 
task paradigms include pressing a button when a target symbol is presented while 
repeating digits that have been presented verbally (Karatekin, Couperus, & Marcus, 
2004), tracking a light with a stylus while pressing a button every 5 seconds (Brown & 
Bennett, 2002), or determining if presented numbers are odd or even while determining 
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whether combinations of letters were words or non-words (Waters & Green, 2003).  The 
dependent variable is most often reaction time, but accuracy of responses may also be 
measured.  Performance is usually measured on both tasks, which is usually poorer than 
when doing each task on its own.  However, it has been found that after practice on one 
of the tasks, dual task interference is reduced (Eysneck & Keane, 2010).  The decreased 
dual task interference is posited to occur because the well-practiced task becomes 
automatic and thus taxes fewer cognitive resources. 
 
The amount of practice required for a process to be deemed automatic in an experiment 
varies from study to study.  The amount of practice can range from a number of hours 
(Wu, Kansaku & Hallett, 2004), to days (Kubler, Dixon & Garavan, 2006), to weeks 
(Bebko et al., 2003).  The criteria for deeming a behaviour as automatic again varies from 
study to study, and is largely dependent on the type of task.  The criteria may be engaging 
in the behaviour with total accuracy or increasing speed by a certain percentage.  Other 
studies merely consider the lack of dual task interference as evidence of automaticity.  
These inconsistencies across studies again stress the need for a more refined definition of 
automaticity, which may be accomplished through the use of a feature based approach. 
  
Another difference between traditional dual task studies and any study of whether 
smoking is an automatic process is controlling the amount of experience people have 
with the smoking behaviour.  In most dual task research, the studied behaviours are 
initially novel, such as juggling (Bebko et al., 2003), and the researcher can control the 
participants‟ amount of practice and level of performance.  Smoking, however, is not a 
behaviour that can be practiced in the lab.  Each person has his or her own unique history 
with smoking.  Some individuals may have had their first cigarette years ago, while 
others may have only started smoking within the last few months. Some smokers are 
daily smokers, while others may only smoke on weekends.  There are many possible 
differences in smoking history and current smoking behavior.  Given this variability in 
smoking, it will be impossible to directly study the development of smoking behaviour.  
We can only rely on self-reports of smoking to ascertain experience.  However, by using 
the dual task paradigm, it is possible to determine whether the current experience of 
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smoking interferes with some other cognitive task. 
 
Baxter and Hinson (2001) used the dual task paradigm in an investigation of smoking as 
an automatic process.  Participants were trained to recognize a target tone.  They then 
listened for the target tone under four separate conditions; no smoking, smoking, 
pseudosmoking, and holding a cigarette.  The participants were classified as experienced 
smokers (having smoked more than 800 cigarettes in their lifetime) or novice smokers 
(having smoked less than 100 cigarettes in their lifetime).  The pseudosmoking condition 
involved performing all smoking behaviours except for inhaling the smoke of the 
cigarette.  The premise behind this condition was that it would be difficult for 
experienced smokers to break the automatic action schema without diverting their 
attention to the smoking behaviour.  Similar reasoning was held for the holding 
condition.  As expected, experienced smokers‟ performance on the tone recognition task 
was similar in the smoking and no smoking condition.   Performance was significantly 
impaired during the pseudosmoking condition.  Smokers had to divert their attention 
from the tone recognition task to halt the smoking action sequence.  In contrast, novice 
smokers‟ performance was equally impaired in both the smoking and pseudosmoking 
conditions.     
 
As with almost all dual task research, Baxter and Hinson (2001) analyzed mean reaction 
times on the tone recognition task.  Similar reaction times in the no smoking and smoking 
conditions for experienced smokers were interpreted as evidence for automaticity.  
Reaction times were greater in the pseudosmoking condition.  Although significant 
differences were found in response times, it is not clear why these differences occurred.  
Tone recognition is not the result of a single cognitive process.  There are numerous 
possible explanations for the differences in performance between conditions.   Traditional 
statistical methods, such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), are useful for detecting 
differences between experimental conditions, but they are not designed to assess and 
compare the various contributions of underlying cognitive processes (Batchelder, 
Chosak-Reiter, Shankle, & Dick, 1997). 
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To gain a better understanding of any behaviour, one must go beyond the observation of 
the behaviour itself.  Luce (1995, 1999) argues that the main difference between various 
models of behaviour is whether the “black box” remains closed or is opened.  
Behavioural observation is looking at the box closed – merely observing the inputs and 
outputs.  There is no internal structure specified within the model.  Luce argues that most 
psychological theories are of this nature; “they attempt to characterize aspects and 
patterns of behaviour without asking about the underlying, internal mechanisms that give 
rise to the behaviour” (Luce 1995, p. 3).   
 
Information Processing Models 
 
Information-processing models strive to open the black box of behaviour.  These models 
attempt to describe a structure or architecture that information must pass through when 
received.  This information then results in a response set, resulting then in some sort of 
feedback.  Luce (1999) states that information processing models may be thought of as 
trying to describe analytically a flow diagram of mental activity based on certain 
elementary processing stages.  The advantage of information-processing models over 
behavioural models is they provide natural accounts of temporal aspects in decision-
making.  It is possible to identify where errors occurred in the formation of an inaccurate 
response.  Using input-output models, when an inaccurate response is made, one has no 
way to identify why the error has been made.  There are numerous possibilities, such as 
problems with memory, retrieval, or making a response.  However, it is impossible to 
know when only the response is examined.  Using an information processing model 
approach, it is possible to identify the source of the error. 
Townsend & Wenger (2004a) argue that much of the evidence for psychological theory is 
circumstantial and can only be said to be consistent with an assumption, but most of the 
time does not come from a direct test of that assumption.  In their study of smoking as an 
automatic process, Baxter and Hinson‟s (2001) results appear consistent with the 
assumption that smoking in experienced smokers is an automatic process.  Since 
performance was equal in both the smoking and non-smoking conditions in experienced 
smokers, this was taken as evidence for smoking as an automatic process.  However, 
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there is no direct evidence that smoking is, in fact, an automatic process.  All that is 
certain is that the output (reaction time) is the same for both conditions.   
Information processing models, according to Townsend and Wenger (2004a), have four 
components; architecture, stopping rules, independence and capacity.  Architecture may 
be serial or parallel. Serial processing occurs when each element is processed one at a 
time, each element being completed before the next is begun.  Parallel processing occurs 
when processing begins on all elements simultaneously and continues until each element 
is completed (Townsend & Ashby, 1983).  In addition to the distinction between serial 
and parallel models, there is also the consideration of a special kind of parallel processing 
called coactive processing models (Townsend & Nozawa, 1995).  In separate parallel 
processing models, each process goes through its own channel.  In coactivation models, 
processes are consolidated into a single channel. 
 
Stopping rules refer to whether cognitive processing is self-terminating or exhaustive.  A 
self-terminating process occurs when the mechanism responsible for the processing is 
able to stop when the desired element is found among all stimulus elements (Townsend & 
Ashby, 1983).  Exhaustive processing occurs when all the elements are processed prior to 
cessation.  Self-terminating processing is best illustrated by a target element being one of 
the first items in a set of elements.  If the target element was F, and the set of elements 
was T F R Q J, processing would stop at F and there would be no processing of R Q J.  
Evidence for self-terminating processing is reaction times. Reaction times for the set T F 
R Q J would be shorter than for the set T R F Q J. Exhaustive processing can occur 
regardless if the target is present or absent.  It could occur if the target set were J U R A 
H (target absent) or if the target set were T F R Q J (target present).  Even though the 
target is found early in the target set, all remaining letters are processed.  Again, evidence 
for exhaustive processing is the reaction times.  Both sets would be processed in the same 
amount of time despite the fact that one set contains the target and the other does not.  If 
processing were self-terminating, reaction times for the target present set would be 
quicker than for the target absent set. 
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Independence refers to the relationships among the rates of processing for each of the 
inputs (Townsend & Wenger, 2004a).  If the information processing is independent, the 
processing of element A does not affect the processing of element B.  No matter what 
occurs in the processing of element A, processing of element B will remain unchanged.  
A violation of independence occurs when the processing of a preceding target somehow 
affects the processing of the following target.   
 
Capacity refers to the speed and accuracy of a processing system when its load is varied 
(Townsend & Ashby, 1983).    There are three different possibilities for capacity.  The 
first is unlimited capacity.  If the processing system has unlimited capacity, increases in 
task load do not result in a decrease in performance.  For example, if an increase in the 
number of targets in a memory set did not produce a change in reaction time, then 
capacity would be considered unlimited.  In contrast, limited capacity is when processing 
load affects performance.  Increases in workload push at processing limits.  Finally, there 
is super capacity.  This refers to an increase in performance ability when there is an 
increase in load. 
 
The unlimited capacity, independent, parallel (UCIP) model (Townsend & Wenger, 
2004) may be used in order to conceptualize how “automatic” processing may look from 
an information processing modeling perspective.  If a process is automatic, it is 
reasonable to assume that capacity is unlimited.  The processing requirement of one task 
does not impact the processing of another task.  Similarly, automatic processing should 
be independent, in that the processing of one task does not affect the processing of 
another element.  That automatic processing may require a parallel system is a reasonable 
assumption.  If a process is automatic, its components would not need to be processed 
one at a time.  However, it has also been suggested that automatic processing may be 
coactive (Townsend, Fific, & Neufeld, 2007) depending on the type of processing.  The 
use of information processing models could be used in order to move towards a more 
features based approach of automatic processing. 
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Response Times in the Study of Information Processing Models 
 
Response time (RT) research has a long history in psychology.  RT research has served as 
a tool to study various cognitive processes and to more fully understand information 
processing models.  By studying the length of time a particular task takes, and comparing 
it to the time other tasks take, one can make inferences about the processes involved.  The 
first publication using response times was by Donders (1868/1969).  He proposed the 
“method of subtraction”.   He argued that by subtracting the response time of a simple 
task from the response time of a more complex task, one could estimate that amount of 
time it took for the more difficult task.  For example, a participant is shown a target 
element (e.g., the letter A).  In the first recognition task the participant is shown two 
elements (F A).  In a second task the participant is shown five elements (G J X F A).  The 
difference in response times would represent the time that it took to process the three 
additional elements.  This argument rests on the assumption that cognitive processes 
occur in a serial manner.  In relation to the method of subtraction is the concept of pure 
insertion (Donders, 1868/1969).  The underlying assumption of pure insertion is that 
adding a component to a task, does not change the operation of other tasks.  The 
investigation of pure insertion has largely been unpopular, as it is practically impossible 
to test at the RT mean level (Townsend & Ashby, 1983).   
 
Response times continue to be a useful tool in the measurement of cognitive processes.  
The evolution of mathematical modeling has allowed researchers to use RTs without the 
constraints of the assumption of seriality, as is the case with the method of subtraction.  
Some of the mathematical tools that may be used in the study of information processing 
models are the probability density function, the cumulative probability distribution 
function, the survivor function and the hazard function.   There are an infinite number of 
probability laws and functions, including the normal and exponential (Townsend, et al., 
2007). The probability density function [f (t)] indicates how completion probabilities 
change over time.  Probability density functions are illustrated as a line curve, with 
reaction time on the X-axis and the function on the Y-axis, as illustrated in Figure 1.  The 
cumulative probability distribution function [F(t)] represents the probability of an event  
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Figure 1.  Example of a Probability Density Function (from Townsend & Ashby, 
1983) 
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occurrence at or before reaction time t.   The cumulative probability distribution function 
will always be either increasing or flat, its smallest value 0 and its largest value will be 1 
(Wenger & Townsend, 2000).  An example can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Another function of interest is the survivor function [S(t)].  This function indicates the 
probability that completion has not yet occurred.  The survivor function is 
complementary to the cumulative probability distribution, and as such is calculated as 1 – 
F(t).  Another function that is widely used in information processing modeling is the 
hazard function [h(t)].  The hazard function is a ratio of the density function over the 
survivor function,  
 
    
    
.     
It indicates the probability of item completion immediately, given that it has not yet been 
completed.  The hazard function comes from the concept of power in physics, and is 
conceptualized as the amount of power a system must use to transition a process from 
incompletion to completion (Wenger & Townsend, 2000). Neufeld, Townsend and Jette 
(2007) describe the hazard function as “a transitory function of time and therefore 
difficult to estimate empirically” (pg. 212).  Therefore, when using the hazard function in 
order to calculate capacity measures, it is best to use the integrated hazard function H(t), 
which is a more reliable estimate of the amount of “energy expenditure” that takes place 
in cognitive processing.  The formula to calculate the integrated hazard function is    -
ln[S(t)] where ln(x) stands for the natural logarithm of x. Other methods of calculating 
the integrated hazard function do exist, such as the Nelson-Aalen estimator (Aaalen, 
Borgan, & Gjessing, 2008), however -ln[S(t)] is most commonly used. 
 
The integrated hazard function can be used to calculate both capacity coefficients and 
capacity ratios (CR). CR is used to compare performances between two conditions to 
investigate whether one condition is more capacity taxing than the other. The ratio  
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would allow for comparison of processing between the two conditions. If the ratio equals 
1 then that would indicate that cognitive processing in each of the conditions was equal, 
and the manipulation in condition 1 did not tax capacity in relation to the processing 
capacity of condition 2.  If the ratio is less than 1 that would indicate that the 
manipulation in condition 1 taxed capacity more in relation to condition 2.   Finally, if the 
ratio was greater than 1 that would indicate that condition 1 taxed capacity less than 
condition 2.   
 
The use of CR can be demonstrated using a paradigm employed by Jette (1997). 
Participants were presented with six lamps, two placed centrally, two on the right 
periphery and two on the left periphery. They were instructed to indicate which lamp lit 
up on a six button panel. The response task was completed amidst one second bursts of 
white noise. The noise levels were of three intensities. The hypothesis was that 
performances would be improved in the more intense noise condition, as processing 
capacity was expected to increase with noise levels.  (Neufeld et al., 2007).  When 
comparing performance across noise intensity conditions, CR was calculated by  
                       
                        
  
The capacity ratios were less than 1, indicating that processing capacity was more greatly 
taxed in the lower noise condition than in the higher noise condition. Performance was 
impaired in the low noise condition in comparison to the high noise level condition, 
which was consistent with a proposed mechanism of selectively improved performance 
under higher noise conditions.   
 
Another method to use the integrated hazard function is the OR capacity coefficient, 
Co(t).  While CR can measure capacity demands across conditions generally, Co(t) also 
takes into consideration specific increments in task load.  The capacity coefficient is the 
ratio of the integrated hazard function when two features are present as the numerator, 
and the sum of the two integrated hazard functions for the conditions in which each 
feature is presented individually.  If the capacity ratios equals 1, capacity is unlimited. If 
it is less than 1, this indicates limited capacity, and if it is greater than 1, it indicates super 
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capacity.  The equation is (c = feature present in channel, 0 = feature absent in channel): 
Co(t) =  
         
                        
  
  
A use for this type of capacity coefficient is seen in a study of the processing of faces 
(Wenger & Townsend, 2001). Faces are made up of a number of features, including eyes, 
nose and mouth.  It has been argued that faces are processed as a whole, rather than as 
sets of multiple features.  Wenger and Townsend used the capacity coefficient to 
empirically test whether this was indeed the case. Participants were presented with faces 
with mouth and eyes simultaneously present, only the eyes present, only the mouth 
present, or no features present. Respondents were asked to respond affirmatively if either 
the eyes or mouth were present in all of the presentations. The capacity coefficients were 
less than 1 which indicated capacity was limited when both features were present in 
comparison to when only one feature was presented at a time.  This was a surprising 
result and contradicted the expectation that faces were processed as a whole. Having 
multiple features taxed capacity in comparison to only having to attend to one feature at a 
time. 
 
In the experimental design used by Wenger and Townsend (2000), participants were 
instructed to make a response if at least one of the features was present. This is an 
example of an OR design. The participant makes a positive response whether the target is 
in either of the channels. Theoretically this process is self-terminating as the participant 
may make a response if the target is in the first channel, obviating the need to process the 
second channel. Another experimental design is the AND design. In this type of design, 
respondents are instructed to respond only if a target is in both channels. In this design, 
exhaustive processing must be used since participants need to process both targets. The 
capacity coefficient for the AND design is 
Ca(t)=  
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The capacity coefficient for the AND condition incorporates K(t), which Townsend and 
Wenger (2004b) argue is analogous to the integrated hazard function, H (t). While H(t) is 
the conditional likelihood that an event will happen momentarily given that is has not yet 
happened, K (t) is the conditional likelihood that an event occurred just before t, given 
that it has happened by time t. The calculation is 
K(t) = ln[F(t)] ≤ 0 
The calculation of H(t) relies on the survivor function, whereas the calculation of K(t) 
relies on the density function integral.  According to Townsend & Wenger (2004b) the 
“inversion” in the AND capacity coefficient makes the interpretation of the coefficient 
identical to the interpretation of the Co(t) coefficient.  A Ca(t) value of greater than 1 
indicates super capacity (an increase in load actually increases performance), a value of 1 
indicates unlimited capacity (an increase in load does not affect performance), and a 
value less than 1 indicates limited capacity (an increase in load decreases performance.    
Townsend and Wenger also state that it is unclear whether K(t) will gain widespread 
popularity in mathematical modeling. The use of the AND coefficient is currently novel 
and its use in the current study is largely exploratory. 
 
Smoking as an Automatic Process and Capacity 
 
It is hypothesized that smoking does become an automatic process.  While smoking 
contains a number of behavioral components that require attention, experienced smokers 
eventually are able to smoke while doing a secondary task.  This suggests that with 
practice, the attentional need required for smoking decreases as the smoker gains more 
experience with smoking. Smokers‟ own reports of smoking being automatic (Johnson et 
al., 2005) also suggests that the need for attention decreases with smoking experience.  
Baxter and Hinson‟s (2001) results support the notion that smoking does become an 
automatic process.   
As previously discussed, it has been suggested that the study of automaticity should be a 
feature-based approach (Moors & DeHower, 2006).  Capacity can be conceptualized as a 
feature of automaticity.  As found by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), the number of items 
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in a memory set did not affect response time performance in the consistent mapping 
condition.  The number of items included did not appear to tax capacity, although this is 
inferred based on mean reaction times and not an analysis of capacity coefficients.   
 
While smoking may not resemble traditional cognitive tasks used in dual task research, 
the act of smoking and the cognitive processes that underlie it, should not tax the 
processing of a secondary task if smoking is automatic.  Returning to the concept of pure 
insertion (Donders 1868/1969), the addition of smoking should not impact performance 
on a secondary task.  The task should be completed identically, whether smoking is 
occurring or not.  While mean reaction times cannot address pure insertion, the use of 
capacity ratios can provide as with evidence whether smoking is affecting the processing 
of the secondary task.  In contrast, if the smoking act is guided by controlled processing it 
would be expected to tax capacity.   The act of smoking for a novice smoker should be a 
relatively controlled task and should tax the ability to process a secondary task.   
 
The purpose of the present analysis is to utilize capacity ratios (CR) to determine whether 
smoking does tax capacity.  Capacity coefficients will also be calculated in order to 
determine the capacity demands of different types of stimulus presentations.  Capacity 
ratios will be calculated to test whether smoking or pseudosmoking taxes capacity in 
comparison to no smoking. It is expected that for experienced smokers, the CR will be 
close to 1 when comparing performance during smoking and non-smoking conditions.  
This will show that the addition of smoking does not tax capacity.  However, during the 
pseudosmoking condition, the CR should be less than 1, indicating that pseudosmoking 
does tax capacity in experienced smokers.  For novice smokers, the CR for both the 
smoking and pseudosmoking conditions should be less than one when compared to the 
non-smoking condition since both of these behavior should be under controlled 
processing and thus should tax capacity.    
 
The data will then be re-analyzed using an analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The inclusion 
of this analysis is meant to serve as a comparison between the traditional ANOVA 
approach to evaluating differences in reaction times and the information processing 
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model approach. It is the goal of this comparison to evaluate whether the overall results 
are comparable, and whether the capacity ratios and coefficients do serve as a more fine-
grain approach to evaluating reaction time data.  Lastly, capacity ratios will be compared 
between smokers who primarily use cigarettes when using alcohol (high co-users) and 
those who do not (low co-users). As discussed in the introduction, the pairing of 
cigarettes and alcohol on a consistent basis may have an impact on the development of 
the automaticity of smoking behaviour.  
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Calculating Capacity Coefficients and Ratios   
 
The following section is a detailed description of the procedures used to calculate 
capacity ratios and capacity coefficients. While it has been argued that capacity 
coefficients and ratios can be extremely useful in psychological research, their 
mathematical sophistication may be intimidating to the novice user.  
 
Capacity coefficients and ratios may be used in various experimental designs, however, 
they will be illustrated in the context of the procedures used in the current series of 
studies. The task used in the current study is a modified version of one used by Egeth and 
Dagenbach (1991).  There were two stimulus positions, one located on the left side of the 
computer screen (X_) and one on the right (_X). Participants were instructed to respond 
affirmatively if they saw the target X, and to make an alternate response if the target was 
not present. The non-target was O. Each of the two target positions may have included an 
X, O, or was left blank. The various combinations of stimuli can be seen in Figure 3.  
   
Once reactions times were collected and incorrect responses were discarded, a number of 
issues needed to be addressed prior to proceeding with analysis. One of the criticisms of 
traditional statistical analysis is the treatment of outliers.   Often the issue is ignored, or 
certain percentages on both tails of the distribution are discarded.  However, it is often 
the outliers that are of most interest in regards to reaction times.  In addition, reaction 
times often lack a normal distribution, but are positively skewed.  Capacity coefficients 
are distribution general, so the analysis is not impacted by the shape of the distribution.   
However, there will be responses that are likely anticipatory or a result of dissattention 
(Neufeld, et al., 2007).  For the current study, reaction times less than 100 ms and greater 
than 3000ms were discarded (personal communication, Neufeld).  Wenger and Townsend 
suggest that no greater than 10% of data points should be discarded from the analysis 
(2000).  
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Once outliers are discarded, a certain amount of time needs to be subtracted to account 
for base processes. The base processes are those processes that are involved in making a 
response, but not part of the cognitive processes. These are mainly the rudimentary 
process involved in responding, such as the physical movements of pressing a response 
key (Carter, Neufeld & Benn, 1998). For the current study 160 ms were subtracted to 
account for base processes (Townsend, 1984; Woodworth, Schlossberg, Kling, & Riggs, 
1971). 
 
Once the data were prepared, reaction times for each variable were placed in bins. These 
bins are collections of reaction times.  The bin values were adapted from Neufeld, et al. 
(2007) which used a boundary of 600 ms for the initial bin, and then increased by 200 ms 
for each subsequent bin.  This binning procedure was based on the precedent of Hockey 
(1970). The initial bin in the current study was set at 0-400 ms.  This decrease in bin size 
was used as the current study involved only two possible responses (target present – yes 
or no), whereas there were six possible responses in the previous study. It was 
hypothesized that given the decreased number of responses, processing time may be 
decreased and be more accurately captured in a smaller initial bin. The remaining bins 
were consistent with Neufeld et al.‟s methodology and increased by 200 ms increments; 
0-400 milliseconds, 400-600 milliseconds, 600-800 milliseconds, 800-1000 milliseconds.   
 
When amalgamating data across participants, it is important to ensure that data within 
each group are homogenous. There are numerous sources of variance within data. These 
can be due to the process model, individual differences, base processes, and within-
subject residual (Carter, Neufeld & Benn, 1998). For the current analysis, the process 
model variance would be the variance in capacity due to the experimental manipulations. 
In order to assess homogeneity, first a two factor analysis of variance is conducted. The 
two factors are the bins and smoking groups. The dependent variable is the reaction 
times. By conducting this ANOVA, it is possible to obtain the Mean Squares which are 
required to utilize the formula  
1 – 
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(Neufeld, et al., 2007). The closer to 1 that alpha coefficient is, the more homogenous the 
groups. 
 
Once group homogeneity is established, it is then possible to calculate capacity ratios and 
coefficients.  The first step is to calculate the observed proportions of respondents in each 
response time bin for each condition.   The next step is to calculate the estimated survivor 
function [S(t)].  The survivor function indicates the probability that completion has not 
yet occurred.  The survivor function is complementary to the cumulative probability 
distribution, and as such is calculated as 1 – F(t).  The next step is to calculate the 
integrated hazard function.  The formula to calculate the integrated hazard function is    
H(t)=-ln[S(t)]  
where ln(x) stands for the natural logarithm of x. This formula is used in order to 
calculate the integrated hazard function for capacity ratios and the OR capacity 
coefficient. However, when calculating the AND capacity coefficient the formula is  
        K(t) = ln [F(t)]  
Once integrated hazard functions and K(t) are available, both capacity coefficients and 
ratios may be calculated.  Capacity ratios and coefficients with values less than 1, 
indicate limited capacity.  Values equal to 1 indicate that capacity is unlimited.  Values 
greater than 1 indicate super capacity.   
  
While conclusions can be made regarding capacity requirements based on the value of 
the capacity ratios or coefficients, currently there is no accepted statistical method to 
compare whether these capacity measures differ from one another.  While traditional 
ANOVA may include between group or condition post-hoc analysis to test for significant 
differences, these tests are unavailable for capacity measures.  Results will be interpreted 
based on whether capacity is limited, unlimited or super.  Between group differences may 
be described, however statistical significance is not described.  Capacity ratios may also 
be compared between individuals, if there are an adequate number of response times per 
individual.  The current study, however, does not allow for individual comparisons.  
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Analysis 1 
The purpose of the current analysis is to assess, through the use of capacity ratios and 
coefficients, whether smoking taxes cognitive capacity amongst groups of smokers.  For 
each of the stimulus configurations, capacity ratios will be calculated.  In addition to 
capacity ratios between conditions, capacity coefficients will be utilized in order to assess 
the processing requirements of distinct stimulus configurations.  
 
Three sets of capacity ratios will be calculated.  The first set will compare the capacity 
requirements for the smoking condition to the non-smoking condition.  For participants 
with little smoking experience, capacity ratios should be less than one, indicating limited 
capacity.  This would indicate that smoking is capacity taxing in comparison to the non-
smoking condition. For regular smokers, the capacity ratio should be close to 1, 
indicating unlimited capacity. This would support the hypothesis, that smoking is 
automatic, when using capacity as an indicator of automaticity. 
 
The second set of capacity ratios will compare the pseudosmoking condition to the non-
smoking condition. It is hypothesized that the capacity ratios for all groups, regardless of 
smoking categorization, should be less than one indicating limited capacity. For 
participants with minimal smoking experience, the act of bringing the cigarette to and 
from the mouth should require capacity. For experienced smokers, the act of ceasing the 
smoking behaviour partway through, should tax capacity. If smoking is automatic, than 
attention is needed in order to cease the behaviour. 
 
The third set of capacity ratios will compare the capacity requirements of pseudosmoking 
to the smoking condition.  For non-smokers, the capacity ratios should be greater than 1, 
indicating that pseudosmoking is less capacity taxing than smoking.    The inhalation of 
cigarette smoke should be more capacity taxing than simply moving the cigarette to the 
mouth, so the removal of this behaviour during the pseudosmoking condition may reduce 
the capacity need.  For smokers, the capacity ratio should be less than1, indicating 
pseudosmoking actually taxes capacity more than smoking itself. 
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Capacity coefficients will be calculated in order to assess the capacity demand for the OR 
and AND conditions.  The stimulus configurations were designed to investigate mental 
processing in one and two target conditions.  For the OR conditions, the hypothesis is that 
double targets will tax capacity more in comparison to the single target condition.  The 
stimulus configurations also include double and single non-target conditions (OO, O_, 
_O).  These configurations may be used in order to calculate the AND coefficient, as both 
stimuli need to be processed in order to make a response. The use of the AND coefficient 
is currently theoretical and has not been used in research, so its use is largely exploratory.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 
114 (70 males, 44 females) individuals participated in the study. Participants were 
initially recruited from an introductory psychology course and received course credit for 
their participation.  Participants were required to be at least 19 years of age, as that is the 
legal smoking age in Ontario, where the experiment took place.  There were no 
participatory requirements in terms of smoking experience. Additional participants were 
recruited by poster advertising and paid $10. Posters were placed throughout a university 
campus and attracted both students and university staff.  These participants were required 
to smoke at least one cigarette per day.  The addition of this inclusion criterion was 
required to increase the number of regular smokers in the study.  Data from 100 
participants were used in the analysis as reaction times were unavailable for 14 
participants due to a number of reasons, including computer difficulties and refusal to 
smoke in the smoking conditions.  These participants still received course credits or 
payment for their participation.  This study received ethical approval from a university 
Research Ethics Board, which can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Measures 
 
A number of smoking measures were included in the study in order to obtain information 
about smoking status, including current smoking behavior, past experience with smoking, 
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and levels of dependence.   
 
Timeline Follow-back Interview (Sobell & Sobell, 1995).  The Timeline Follow-back 
Interview was originally designed to assess recent alcohol use but has been adapted for 
other types of substance use (TLFB; Sobell & Sobell).  The TLFB uses a calendar in 
order to assess substance use in a specified timeframe, usually within the last 30 days.  
There have been some studies that have examined the validity and reliability of the TLFB 
in measuring smoking.  Brown et al. (1998) found that the TLFB had good validity and 
reliability in assessing smoking patterns in a sample of adults undergoing smoking 
cessation treatment.  Correlations between the TLFB and monitored daily reports of 
smoking ranged from 0.67 to 0.97.  Lewis-Esquerre et al.(2005) also found the TLFB was 
valid in a sample of adolescent smokers.  It was significantly correlated with two 
measures of smoking dependence, saliva nicotine levels and respiratory symptoms, as 
well as a global single item measure (“How many cigarettes per day do you currently 
smoke?”). When participants were completing the TLFB for smoking they were also 
asked to estimate the number of standard size alcohol drinks (1 bottle of regular strength 
beer, 1.5 ounces of hard liquor, or 5 ounces of wine) they consumed per day during the 
last 30 days in order to assess for cigarette and alcohol co-use.  
 
Lifetime Smoking Questionnaire (Baxter & Hinson, 2001). The Lifetime Smoking 
Questionnaire was specifically designed for Baxter & Hinson‟s study of the automaticity 
of smoking behaviour.  Participants were asked to estimate when they had their first 
cigarette and when their most recent cigarette was smoked. They were also asked to 
estimate the number of cigarettes smoked per day for each year that they had smoked.  In 
their study, Baxter and Hinson found a naturally occurring division among the 
participants; those who smoked more than 800 cigarettes over their lifetime and those 
who smoked less than 100 cigarettes in their lifetime.  However, Massak (unpublished 
thesis) found that 11 out of 88 participants did not fall within one of these two groups in a 
similar sample of undergraduate students. 
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The Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence (FTND; Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, 
& Fagerstrom, 1991).  The FTND is a 10-item measure in which participants are queried 
about their smoking habits.  Scores on the FTND range from 0-10, with higher scores 
indicating more severe levels of dependence.  Although the FTND is one of the most 
widely used assessment instruments to measure dependency, it does have limitations.  It 
has been criticized for its psychometric properties, and its assumption that physical 
dependence is the key component in dependence (Piper et al., 2004).   
 
Nicotine Dependence Syndrome Scale (NDSS; Shiffman, Waters, & Hickcox, 2004).  In 
addition to an overall score of dependence, the questionnaire includes five subscales 
measuring various aspects of dependence. These subscales are Drive, Priority, Tolerance, 
Continuity and Stereotypy. Drive measures the compulsion to smoke.  Priority reflects 
the desire to smoke above other activities.  Tolerance measures the diminished effects of 
smoking over time.  Continuity measures the regularity of smoking (i.e. smoking patterns 
over the day). Stereotypy measures the invariance of smoking behaviour (i.e. smoking is 
not affected by mood or illness). The scale is scored to produce standardized scores with 
a mean of 0, and a standard deviation of 1 (Shiffman & Sayette, 2005).   This measure 
has been found to have high internal reliability and good test-retest correlations.    
 
Task 
 
As previously described, the purpose of the task was to respond by pressing one keyboard 
key when the target “X” was shown on the stimulus screen, and to respond by pressing a 
different keyboard key if “X” was not present.  Responses were made by using the non-
dominant hand, so that the dominant hand was available to hold a cigarette during the 
smoking conditions.  Right handed smokers were asked to press the “A” key if the target 
was present and the “S” key if the target was absent.  Left-handed smokers were asked to 
press the “K” key if the target was present and the “L” key if the target was absent.   The 
experimental task was set up using e-prime, from which the reaction times were obtained. 
The task took place in a well-ventilated laboratory that had been designed and 
constructed to conduct smoking research.  
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After providing consent to participate and completing the previously described 
questionnaires, participants completed practice trials to become accustomed to the task.  
They received 80 practice trials, with 10 presentations of each of the 8 stimulus 
configurations. These practice trials were completed under no smoking conditions.  After 
this practice period there were 20 presentations of each of the 8 stimulus configurations.     
under each smoking condition.  The stimulus configurations were presented in random 
order.   
 
Each participant completed the task under each of the smoking conditions.   One 
condition was the no-smoking condition.  All smoking paraphernalia was out of view of 
the participant during this condition, and they were instructed to complete the reaction 
time task.  Another condition was the smoking condition, in which the participant was 
asked to do the monitoring task while smoking a cigarette.  Participants were given the 
option of smoking their own cigarettes or presented with three brands of cigarettes 
supplied by the experimenter.  These brands were the top sellers at a university 
convenience store according to the store clerk. Participants were asked to light the 
cigarette prior to beginning the task.  Participants were instructed to smoke at a pace 
under which they would normally smoke.  A clean ashtray was provided for each of the 
conditions. The final condition was the pseudosmoking condition which involved holding 
a lit cigarette and bringing it up to the mouth, without inhaling.  Participants were 
instructed to light the cigarette prior to beginning the task, and to bring the cigarette to 
their mouth without “taking a drag.”  Participants were supplied with a clean ash tray in 
order to shake off the excess ash. 
 
The smoking conditions were presented randomly to each participant.  The experimenter 
remained in the room with the participant during all of the conditions to ensure that 
instructions regarding the smoking conditions were followed.  Conditions were presented 
consecutively, with no breaks between conditions due to time constraints. The 
completion of questionnaires and the reaction time task took approximately 45 minutes.  
Participants were debriefed following the completion of the experiment. 
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Results 
Smoking Groups 
 
Participants were categorized as belonging to one of four groups based on their smoking 
in the last 30 days as measured by the TLFB: no smoking in the last 30 days, smoking on 
1-14 days in the last 30 days (light smokers), smoking on 16-29 days in the last 30 days 
(moderate), and smoking everyday in the last 30 days.  The light smokers and moderate 
smokers were a naturally occurring group, as no participants smoked on 15 days.  
Descriptive information can be found in Table 1.  There were significant differences 
between groups in terms of demographics, smoking history, smoking behaviour in the 
last 30 days, and on dependence measures. There was a significant difference in mean 
age between groups F (3, 96) = 3.51, p = 0.018, and post hoc analysis revealed that the 
daily smokers were significantly older than light smokers.  There was also a significant 
difference between the number of years since trying the first cigarette F (3, 95) = 6.07, p 
= .001.  The daily smokers had their first cigarette significantly earlier than the other 
three groups. 
 
There was a significant difference between smoking groups on the Fagerstrom Test of 
Nicotine Dependence F (2, 72) = 14.43, p < .001.  Daily smokers had significantly higher 
dependence scores than the light and moderate smokers.  There was also a significant 
difference between groups on the NDSS- Total Score F (2, 68) = 29.52, p > 0.001.   Daily 
smokers had significantly higher scores than both the light and moderate smokers, and 
the moderate smokers had higher scores than the light smokers. On the subscales of the 
NDSS, there were significant differences between groups on two of the subscales.  An 
alpha value of .0125 was used to determine significance (.05/4). There were significant 
differences on the Drive scale, F (2, 69) = 24.85, p < .001, with daily smokers scoring 
higher than both the light and moderate smokers and the moderate smokers scoring 
higher than the light smokers. There were also significant differences within the 
Continuity subscale, F (2, 69) = 4.84 p = .011, with daily smokers scoring higher than the 
other two groups.  
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Table 1. 
Means and standard deviations of smoking group descriptives. 
 Non-Smokers 
(N=20) 
Light Smokers 
(N=25) 
Moderate 
Smokers 
(N=29) 
Daily Smokers 
(N=26) 
% Female 40.0% 28.0% 41.4% 53.8% 
Age 20.20 
(2.31) 
19.59 
(1.33) 
20.38 
(2.27) 
23.69 
(9.21) 
# of years since 
first cigarette 
3.60 
(3.75) 
3.38 
(2.08) 
5.00 
(2.94) 
8.96 
(8.96) 
     
Dependence 
Measures 
    
FTND  0.11 
(0.32) 
1.10 
(1.65) 
2.38 
(8.96) 
NDSS – Total  -2.16 
(0.67) 
-1.15 
(0.87) 
-0.34 
(0.72) 
NDSS – Drive  -2.48 
(0.86) 
  -1.43 
(1.15) 
-0.35 
(0.90) 
NDSS – 
Stereotypy 
 -0.40 
(0.97) 
-0.07 
(0.85) 
0.22 
(0.85) 
NDSS-
Continuity 
 -1.38 
(1.15) 
-1.23 
(1.08) 
-0.44 
(1.12) 
NDSS- Priority  -0.41 
(0.27) 
-0.47 
(0.45) 
-0.67 
(0.61) 
NDSS - 
Tolerance 
 -1.00 
(0.80) 
-0.42 
(1.16) 
-0.18 
(1.17) 
     
Timeline 
Followback 
    
# of smoking 
days 
 6.16 
(4.03) 
24.93 
(4.11) 
30.00 
(0) 
# of cigarettes  17.04 
(19.62) 
136.97 
(114.00) 
252.38 
(122.34) 
# of cigarettes 
per day 
 2.24 
(1.44) 
5.18 
(3.89) 
8.41 
(4.08) 
Maximum # of 
cigarettes 
 4.56 
(4.24) 
10.52 
(7.27) 
14.23 
(6.30) 
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There were a number of differences in smoking behavior in the last 30 days as measured 
by the Timeline Followback.  As would be expected given how the groups were formed, 
there were between group differences in number of days smoked in the last 30 days, F (2, 
77) = 358.44, p < .001.  There was also a significant difference in total number of 
cigarettes smoked in the last 30 days, F (2, 77) = 36.37, p < .001, with each group 
differing significantly from each of the others.  The groups each differed significantly 
from one another when comparing daily cigarette consumption on smoking days, F (2, 
77) = 21.04, p < .001.  There were also significant differences between groups on 
maximum number of cigarettes per day, F (2, 77) = 16.06, p = .011.  Daily smokers had a 
significantly higher maximum consumption than did the light smoking group. 
 
Reaction Time Data 
 
Reaction time data were available for 100 participants.  Participants accrued 160 reaction 
times for each smoking condition, which were composed of 20 reaction times for each of 
the eight stimulus configurations.  Reaction times from all participants were combined 
for each stimulus type in each of the three smoking conditions.  Combining the reaction 
times resulted in a possible 2000 reaction time data points per stimulus configuration in 
each of the conditions. Reaction times for inaccurate responses were removed from the 
dataset.  Of 48 000 reaction times, there were 1930 inaccurate responses (4%), and these 
were discarded.  This is well below the 10% guideline that is suggested by Wenger and 
Townsend (2007).  
 
Reaction times less than 100 ms and greater than 3000 ms were discarded.  There were 
16 response times that were less than 100ms, and 212 that were greater than 3000 ms.  
An estimate of movement time (160 ms) was subtracted from each reaction time. 
Negative values were set to zero (n=31).  Residual reactions times for each type of data 
presentation in each of the three conditions were binned. The bin values were 0-400 ms, 
400-600 ms, 600-800 ms, and 800 -1000 ms, which were adapted from Neufeld et al., 
(2007).  
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Capacity Ratios Between Conditions 
  
To assess whether capacity was affected based on smoking condition and smoker groups, 
capacity ratios were calculated. As reaction times were to be analyzed based on smoking 
group memberships, alpha coefficients were calculated to ensure group homogeneity. 
This was calculated using the formula  
1 – 
                         
        
  
 These values can be found in Table 2.  All alpha coefficients were in the 0.99 range, 
indicating good group homogeneity.  In order to calculate capacity ratios, the observed 
proportion of reaction times per bin, estimated survivor function and integrated hazard 
function were calculated for each of the smoking groups in each of the three conditions.  
These can be found in Tables 1-12 in Appendix B.   
 
Capacity ratios for each of the stimulus configurations can be found in Figures 4- 11.  
Overall, results suggest that smoking is capacity taxing regardless of smoking experience.  
Regardless of smoking group, the capacity ratios for smoking in comparison to non-
smoking for all stimulus configurations were less than 1.  This indicates that smoking 
does limit capacity, which supports the hypothesis that smoking does require cognitive 
capacity.  Capacity ratios for those with the least amount of smoking experience, the non-
smokers, ranged from 0.52-0.73 in the 0-400 bin, 0.52-0.68 in the 400-600 bin, 0.46-0.65 
in the 600-800 bin, and 0.44-0.62 in the 800-1000 bin.  For  light smokers the capacity 
ratios ranged from 0.48-0.82 in the 0-400 ms bin, 0.46-0.67 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.46-
0.63 in the 600-800 ms bin, and 0.44-0.68 in the 800-1000 ms bin. For both non-smokers 
and light smokers, capacity ratios remained relatively stable across time bins, with slight 
decreases in capacity ratios in later time bins.  
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Table 2 
.  
Coefficient Alpha Calculation for Smoking Groups X Bins 
 
 MS bins 
*participants 
MS bins Coefficient alpha 
 
XX 
   
No smoking 7645.83 3535749.83 0.9978 
Smoking 1725.32 10458058.00 0.9998 
Pseudosmoking 2450.27 11345521.98 0.9998 
X _    
No smoking 7124.15 5660248.09 0.9987 
Smoking 5427.08 11570786.69 0.9995 
Pseudosmoking 7066.94 15398417.62 0.9995 
_X    
No smoking 6942.09 6974099.03 0.9990 
Smoking 6746.85 12255822.96 0.9994 
Pseudosmoking 8195.26 12858634.90 0.9994 
XO    
No smoking 5741.33 7661772.41 0.9993 
Smoking 7810.19 13795751.56 0.9994 
Pseudosmoking 2738.72 13468934.69 0.9998 
OX    
No smoking 1024.36 12944877.65 0.9999 
Smoking 2707.79 16096144.32 0.9998 
Pseudosmoking 3551.76 16724572.33 0.9998 
OO    
No smoking 4339.58 6467303.59 0.9993 
Smoking 4510.68 9768719.13 0.9995 
Pseudosmoking 5509.47 13089817.53 0.9996 
O_    
No smoking 3361.36 7963541.14 0.9996 
Smoking 2180.09 12879103.90 0.9998 
Pseudosmoking 7516.30 13879912.98 0.9995 
_O    
No smoking 4288.73 8518582.25 0.9995 
Smoking 2590.30 11588595.49 0.9998 
Pseudosmoking 3665.47 15381487.46 0.9998 
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Figure 4.  Capacity Ratios for XX Configuration   
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Figure 5. Capacity Ratios for X_ Configuration 
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Figure 6. Capacity Ratios for  _X Configuration  
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Figure 7.  Capacity Ratios for XO Configuration 
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Figure 8. Capacity Ratios for OX Configuration 
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Figure 9. Capacity Ratios for OO Configuration 
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Figure 10. Capacity Ratios for O _ Configuration 
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Figure 11.Capacity Ratios for  _O Configuration 
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The capacity ratios comparing the smoking and nonsmoking conditions in moderate and 
daily smokers were consistently below 1.  These results did not support the hypothesis 
that smoking had become automatic in the smokers in the present study using capacity as 
an indicator of automaticity.  The capacity ratios for moderate smokers ranged from .58-
0.80 in the 0-400 ms bin, 0.61-0.80 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.65-0.75 in the 600-800 ms 
bin, and 0.63-0.76 in the 800-1000 ms bin.  For the daily smokers the capacity ratios 
ranged from 0.70-0.88 in the 0-400 ms bin, 0.5-0.82 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.64-0.80 in 
the 600-800 ms bin, and 0.63-0.80 in the 800-1000 ms bin. As with the non- and light 
smokers, capacity ratios tended to slightly decrease as response times increased, however 
these decreases were relatively small.  
 
Pseudosmoking also taxed capacity in comparison to the non-smoking condition, as all of 
the capacity ratios comparing the two conditions were less than one.  This supported the 
hypothesis that pseudosmoking would be capacity taxing for all smoking groups.  For 
non- smokers the capacity ratios ranged from 0.57-0.87 in the 0-400 ms bins, 0.52-0.72 in 
the 400-600 ms bins, 0.46-0.74 in the 600-800 ms bin, and 0.47-0.67 in the 800-1000 ms 
bin. For light smokers, the capacity ratios ranged from 0.53-0.74 in the 0-400 ms bin, 
0.47- 0.71 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.48-0.69 in the 600-800 ms bin, 0.52-0.72 in the 800-
1000 ms bin. These capacity ratios tended to overlap with the ratios comparing smoking 
and no smoking. For moderate smokers, the capacity ratios ranged from 0.57-0.75 in the 
0-400 ms bin, 0.52-0.69 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.54-0.65 in the 600-800 bin, 0.54-0.65 in 
the 800-1000 ms bin. For daily smokers the capacity ratios ranged from 0.52-0.75 in the 
0-400 ms bin, 0.51-0.71 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.53-0.64 in the 600-800 ms bin, and 
0.54-0.69 in the 800-1000 ms bin. These capacity ratios tended to be lower than the 
capacity ratios comparing smoking and no smoking conditions. 
  
When comparing capacity requirements for pseudosmoking and smoking, results did 
differ depending on smoking group. For non-smokers and light smokers, the majority of 
capacity ratios were consistently above 1, indicating that processing during the 
pseudosmoking condition was less capacity taxing than in the smoking conditions. For 
non-smokers, the capacity ratios ranged from 0.89-1.19 in the 0-400 ms bins, 0.97-1.15 in 
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the 400-600 bin, 0.94-1.15 in the 600-800 ms bin, and 0.99-1.22 in the 800-1000 ms bin. 
For light smokers, capacity ratios ranged from 0.96-1.11 in the 0-400 ms bin, 0.96-1.07 in 
the 400-600 ms bin, 0.94-1.18 in the 600-800 ms bin, and 0.98-1.22 in the 800-1000 ms 
bin.  These ratios were considerably higher than the capacity ratios comparing smoking 
or pseudosmoking to nonsmoking.  For moderate smokers capacity ratios ranged from 
0.74-0.99 in the 0-400 ms bin, 0.79-0.98 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.80-0.95 in the 600-800 
ms bin, and 0.80-0.91 in the 800-1000 ms bin.  For daily smokers, capacity ratios ranged 
from 0.73-0.93, 0.67-0.94 in the 400-600 ms bin, 0.73-1.03 in the 600-800 ms bin, 0.73-
1.03 in the 800-1000 ms bin. These capacity ratios were also higher than the other two 
sets of capacity ratios.   
 
General Capacity Coefficients 
 
The reaction times for the non-smoking condition for all of the participants were used to 
calculate capacity coefficients.  The observed proportion of reaction times per bin, 
estimated survivor function and capacity indices needed for the calculation of the OR and 
AND capacity coefficients can be found in Tables 13-22 in Appendix B.  
 
The OR and AND capacity coefficients are plotted in Figure 12.  For the OR condition, 
the capacity coefficient indicates limited capacity when two targets are presented in 
comparison to only one target being presented.   Mental processing is taxed more when 
two targets are presented simultaneously than would be expected based on the sum of the 
two targets presented individually. The presence of redundant targets not only does not 
enhance processing, it impedes it. These coefficients were relatively stable across time. 
There were minimal differences in the standard OR coefficient  
Co(t) =  
         
                        
 
 and the coefficient incorporating the distracters 
Co(t) =  
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Figure 12. AND and OR Coefficients for Complete Sample 
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There was a slightly higher capacity coefficient in the first bin when distracters were 
present. 
 
The AND coefficient was greater than 1, indicating super capacity. Redundant  
non-targets enhanced mental processing in comparison to the sum of the individual non-
targets.  The coefficients peaked in the second time bin, and decreased over time.  This 
indicates that the greatest OO advantage was not immediately seen, but rather in the later 
responders.  However, this advantage decreased when additional time lapsed. 
 
The OR capacity coefficients using the standard formula for the all of the smoking groups 
in the smoking and pseudosmoking conditions can be found in Figure 13.  The 
coefficients were all less than 1, indicating limited capacity.  The non-smokers had the 
highest coefficients consistently in the smoking condition.  The coefficient values for the 
pseudosmoking condition were similar across all of the groups.  These results indicated 
that regardless of smoking group or condition, the double targets XX were capacity 
taxing in comparison to the individual targets.  The OR coefficients using the alternate 
formula can be found in Figure 14.  For the smoking condition, the non-smokers had 
larger coefficient values in the first two time bins, but these differences disappeared in 
the later time bins.  In the pseudosmoking condition, the moderate smokers had 
consistently higher coefficients than the other groups in all but the first bin.  
 
The AND coefficients for the smoking and pseudosmoking condition can be found in 
Figure 15.  All of the coefficients were greater than 1, indicating super capacity.  In the 
smoking condition, the light smokers had the highest coefficients in all but the first time 
bin.  There were no distinct patterns among the other groups.  In the pseudosmoking 
condition, the light smokers had capacity coefficients similar to the other groups in the 
first time bin, however the values increased as reaction times elapsed.   
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Figure 13. OR Coefficient (standard formula)   
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Figure 14. OR Coefficient (alternate formula)   
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Figure 15.  AND Coefficient    
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Discussion 
 
The purpose of the current analysis was to examine whether smoking taxed capacity 
during a simple response task, and whether capacity was taxed differently for individuals 
with varying levels of smoking experience. Capacity was defined as a feature of 
automaticity, in a pure insertion sense: the addition of smoking behaviour should not 
impact the processing of a secondary task.  Capacity ratios comparing the smoking and 
non-smoking conditions indicated that smoking does tax capacity, regardless of smoking 
status. However, the capacity requirements appear to decrease with smoking experience. 
If capacity is accepted as an indicator of automaticity, then the hypothesis that smoking 
becomes automatic was not supported. Daily smokers in the current sample required 
cognitive capacity in order to complete smoking behaviour.  
 
Despite the finding that smoking does tax cognitive resources among experienced 
smokers, it may be premature to declare that smoking does not become automatic.  One 
of the limitations of the current analysis is the relatively low dependence levels of the 
daily smokers. Dependence levels as measured by the FTND were low, and lower than in 
the average smoker as measured by the NDSS.  Daily cigarette consumption was also 
relatively low.  The average daily cigarette consumption of the daily smokers was 8.7 
cigarettes per day.   Smoking less than 10 cigarettes per day is often classified as “light” 
smoking across other studies (Repetto, Caldwell, & Zimmerman, 2005).  It would be 
beneficial to replicate the current analysis using heavier smokers to investigate whether 
the capacity requirements for the smoking condition compared to the non-smoking 
condition would indicate unlimited capacity.   This lack of heavy smokers is a definite 
limitation.   
 
Within the current sample, capacity ratios increased as smoking experience and 
dependence levels increased, so it is possible that that capacity ratios would continue to 
increase in a more dependent, heavier smoking sample. Further research with a sample 
including heavier smokers could clarify whether capacity ratios comparing smoking and 
non-smoking do eventually reach 1, or whether there is an upper limit for capacity ratios 
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with respect to smoking behavior.  
Pseudosmoking also taxed capacity for all smoking groups. For non-smokers and light 
smokers, the act of having a lit cigarette to manage while doing the search task was 
capacity taxing.  While the participants did not have to inhale the smoke, the act of 
bringing the cigarette to and from the mouth was cognitively taxing.  Based on these 
results alone, it is impossible to state why all groups of smokers found pseudosmoking to 
be cognitively taxing.  It could be argued that for  both non- and light smokers, 
pseudosmoking is a novel behaviour and that is the reason why it is cognitive taxing. The 
novelty of smoking behaviour, regardless of whether smoke needed to be inhaled or not, 
was sufficient to tax capacity. 
 
For moderate and daily smokers, it is possible that pseudosmoking is cognitively taxing 
because they have to stop a previously learned behaviour.  Smoking is a frequent 
behaviour for these groups, and in order to cease the behaviour partway cognitive 
resources may be required. The capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking to no smoking 
were consistently lower than the capacity ratios comparing smoking to no smoking across 
all stimulus configurations.  This suggests that pseudosmoking is more cognitively taxing 
than smoking.  There is something about pseudosmoking that taxes capacity, but it would 
be premature to definitively conclude that the act of ceasing smoking behaviour itself is 
cognitive taxing.  However, examining the capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and 
smoking conditions provides a direct comparison of smoking behaviour that either 
includes or excludes inhalation of smoke.  
 
While pseudosmoking was found to be capacity taxing for all smoking groups in 
comparison to the non-smoking conditions, the most telling differences were found 
across capacity ratios comparing the pseudosmoking and smoking conditions.  This set of 
capacity ratios were the only ones where there was a clear difference between smoking 
groups.  For the non- and light smokers, the majority of capacity ratios were greater than 
1, indicating super capacity.   
    
Capacity ratios were less than 1 for moderate and daily smokers.  These differences 
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between groups suggests that the act of smoke inhalation may be a key behavioural 
component of smoking in terms of mental processing.  While bringing the cigarette to 
and from the mouth is capacity taxing, as indicated by limited capacity when comparing 
pseudosmoking and no smoking, the act of smoke inhalation requires even more 
cognitive processing. This finding suggests that smoking behaviour can be 
conceptualized as having not only distinct observable behavioural components, but also 
distinct components that require different types of cognitive processing.  
 
Whereas extra cognitive work  is required in order to inhale smoke in inexperienced 
smokers, extra cognitive effort is required for experienced smokers in order to stop the 
smoking schema and prevent the inhalation of smoke . The act of ceasing the smoking 
behaviour partway requires cognitive effort, as illustrated by the capacity ratio being less 
than 1, when comparing pseudosmoking to smoking. If capacity is accepted as an 
indicator of automaticity, this suggests that it is the inhalation of smoke that may become 
automatic in experienced smokers, and preventing this behaviour requires controlled 
processing.   
 
The discussion above suggests that it may be simplistic to conceptualize smoking as a 
single behavior.  As it has been suggested that the study of automatic processing should 
be a features-based approach, it may be that the study of smoking itself should be a 
features based approach.  As the capacity ratios comparing cognitive processing for the 
pseudosmoking and smoking conditions suggest, there may be different cognitive 
requirements for the motor components of smoking (bringing the cigarette to and from 
the mouth), and the inhalation of the smoke.  From a strictly behavioural perspective, arm 
movements in order to bring the cigarette to and from the mouth may require a different 
type of cognitive processing than inhalation of smoke. 
 
In terms of the stimulus configurations, it was found that double targets (XX) did tax 
capacity in comparison to the sum of the individual targets for all smoking groups in all 
of the smoking conditions.  This is consistent with Townsend and Wenger‟s (2001) study 
on faces, where they found that the processing of two facial features was more 
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cognitively taxing than the processing single features.  Additional information does not 
seem to help mental processing, but rather taxes it.    In contrast the AND coefficient 
indicated super capacity.  The processing of two non-targets was more efficient than the 
processing of the sum of each non-target presented individually.  The presence of 
additional information appeared to help participants decide that no target was present 
more efficiently than the sum of the two individual targets.  This may indicate that targets 
and non-targets are processed in different ways.   The double targets may be processed in 
a Gestalt manner, in which the double targets are processed as a whole, rather than as two 
individual targets.   
 
There was little variation between groups when examining OR capacity coefficients for 
the smoking and pseudosmoking conditions.  The non-smokers tended to have the highest 
coefficient values in the smoking condition, indicating that the double target was less 
capacity taxing in comparison to single targets, than for the other groups.  This may 
suggest that the effect of the stimulus load is tempered by the experimental condition.  
The capacity ratios comparing smoking to non-smoking tended to be the lowest for non-
smokers in comparison to the other smoking groups.  Since smoking was already capacity 
taxing, the capacity requirements of stimulus configurations did not have as large an 
effect.  It is possible that there is a limit to how much capacity is taxed.  The OR 
coefficients in the pseudosmoking condition were relatively consistent across smoking 
groups.   
 
The AND coefficients in the smoking and pseudosmoking condition indicated that it was 
the light smokers who found the double non-targets presentation most beneficial.  The 
capacity coefficient was consistently higher for the light smokers in all but the first time 
bin, in both the smoking and pseudosmoking conditions.  It is unclear why the light 
smokers would benefit more greatly in comparison to the other groups.  
 
Another interesting finding was that the X on the left hand of the screen appeared to be 
processed more efficiently than the X on the right hand of the screen when examining the 
individual H(t) values (can be seen in Table 13 in Appendix B).  This difference was also 
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found for the XO and OX configuration.  One possibility to explain this finding is that 
reading in Western culture goes from left to right, and participants may have simply been 
“reading” the target positions serially. However, Simgasiewicz et al. (2010) found that 
regardless of culture, there is a left visual field advantage when doing a visual search 
task. They argue that the left field advantage is due to organizational processes between 
the two brain hemispheres. The left visual field advantage was not found when the 
stimulus target was the non-target, O.  The O on the right side of the screen was 
processed faster than when the O was presented on the left side of the screen.   
 
Regardless of the general processing requirements, the pattern of results was consistent 
across each of the stimulus configurations for each of the smoking groups.  This finding 
may suggest that the complexity of the secondary task does not appear to have an impact 
on capacity.  It is possible that regardless of what a smoker is doing, cigarette smoking 
still requires the same level of mental processing.  When considering the number of 
things that smokers do while smoking, such as driving a car, this may have some serious 
implications.  If mental processing is required in order to smoke, it is possible that this 
reduces the availability of mental processing for other tasks.  Of course this is speculative 
at this point, but it may be beneficial to conduct studies to test the impact of smoking on 
other behaviours.  
 
Overall, the current analysis has provided evidence that smoking does require cognitive 
processing, and that certain components of smoking may be more cognitively demanding 
than others.  Inhalation of smoke, in particular, seems to demand mental processing in 
non- and light smokers.  For moderate and daily smokers, however, it is the cessation of 
this behaviour that requires additional capacity.  A feature-based approach to the study of 
smoking behaviour may be beneficial. 
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Analysis 2 
 
Townsend & Wenger (2004a) argue that much of the evidence for psychological theory is 
circumstantial and can only be said to be consistent with an assumption versus discerning 
those assumptions.  Traditional statistical analysis, such as analysis of variance, may be 
viewed as most often involving such an indirect test of assumptions.  Mean reaction times 
may be affected by a number of different factors, which may or may not be due to the 
variables of interest.  By relying on traditional statistical analysis, conclusions are based 
on the independent variables that are manipulated and the dependent variables that are 
outputted.  All of the processes between input and output are given limited consideration.  
At best, extraneous variables are controlled for statistically, or at worst, ignored.  Luce 
(1995) argues that to truly understand a behaviour, researchers must move beyond simply 
looking at inputs and outputs of behaviour, and open the “black box.”  
 
Another problem with traditional statistical analysis is that it often assumes that data are 
normally distributed.  The more common distributions for reaction times are positively 
skewed, with the majority of responses at the front end of the curve.  Reaction times at 
the tail end of the curve are often treated as outliers and discarded.  However, these late 
responses may provide valuable data about the processing in question.  Mathematical 
modeling allows for the analysis of reaction times without dependence on the normal 
distribution.  In addition to reliance of the normal distribution, the focus of traditional 
analysis is the mean, followed by the standard deviation.  Reliance on the mean provides 
limited information when considering reaction times. If the tail end of the curve is 
discarded, the mean can be greatly impacted.  Also, when dealing with hundreds or 
thousands of reaction times, it seems simplistic to try to capture all the information in a 
single value.   
 
Given the differences between the two types of analysis, comparing the results obtained 
from each type may illustrate these differences on a tangible level.  As demonstrated in 
Analysis 1, smoking did tax capacity, even in the most experienced smokers in the 
sample. While capacity demands decreased as the level of smoking experience increased, 
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there was still a cognitive demand during smoking behavior.  Given that capacity is being 
utilized as an indicator of automaticity, the conclusion drawn was that smoking was not 
fully automatic even in the most experienced smokers in the sample.  This is in contrast 
to conclusions reached by Baxter and Hinson (2001), who used analysis of variance. The 
purpose of the current analysis is to re-analyze the data from Analysis 1 using repeated 
measures analysis of variance, and to compare the results between the two analyses.  This 
provides a direct comparison of the two types of analysis, as the same participants and 
data are used for both. 
 
It is hypothesized that there will be a significant interaction between smoking group and 
smoking condition.  It is predicted that post hoc tests will reveal that non-smokers will 
have significantly slower reaction times in the smoking and pseudosmoking conditions in 
comparison to the non-smoking conditions.  Daily smokers will have significantly slower 
response times in the pseudosmoking condition than in the non-smoking condition.  
Reaction times should be equivalent in the smoking and no-smoking condition.  The 
results for the light smokers should be similar to those of non-smokers, whereas moderate 
smokers should be similar to daily smokers.  
 
 
Method 
  
Methodology for obtaining data has been described in Analysis 1.  As with the previous 
analysis, reaction times were amalgamated into one variable according to stimulus 
configuration and smoking condition (e.g., the XX stimulus configuration under no 
smoking condition).  There were 2000 possible reaction times for each stimulus 
configuration.  Reaction times for inaccurate responses were removed from the data set 
(N=1930).  To ensure that the same reaction times were included as in the previous 
analysis, reaction times less than 100 ms and greater than 3000 ms were removed from 
the dataset.   However, 160 ms was not subtracted for base processes as this is not 
typically done in a traditional ANOVA.   Smoking group classification (non-smoker, 
light smoker, moderate smoker, and daily smoker) was kept consistent from Analysis 1.   
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Repeated measures ANOVA were conducted for each type of stimulus configuration 
separately with smoking group as the between-group factor and smoking condition as the 
within-subject factor. Although, as noted above, reaction times were positively skewed 
the data were not transformed in any manner in order to maintain consistency with the 
study of Baxter & Hinson. 
 
Results 
  
Mean reaction times and standard deviations for each smoking condition can be found in 
Table 3.  A smoking group by smoking condition interaction was found for all of the 
stimulus configurations; F values can be found in Table 4.   The Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjustment needed to be used for all of the analysis as Mauchly‟s test of sphericity was 
significant for all of the analyses.  Graphical representation of these interactions can be 
found in Figure 16.  
Post-hoc tests were conducted to compare mean reaction time for pairs of 
smoking conditions within smoking groups using the Tukey‟s Honestly Significant Test, 
e.g., to compare the mean RT for no-smoking to smoking in non-smokers.  The statistical 
program POST-HOC was used.   Significant q values may be found in Table 5.  For all of 
the smoking groups for each of the stimulus configurations, reaction times in the non-
smoking condition were faster than in either the smoking or pseudosmoking conditions.  
For non-smokers and light smokers, there were no significant differences between the 
pseudosmoking and smoking conditions for any type of stimulus configurations.  For the 
moderate and daily smokers there were significant differences for some of the stimulus 
configurations between the pseudosmoking and smoking conditions, and in each instance 
reaction times were faster in the smoking condition rather than the pseudosmoking 
condition.  
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Table 3.  
 
Mean and Standard Deviations of Reaction Times for All Smoking Groups 
 
 Non-Smokers Light Smokers Moderate 
Smokers 
Daily Smokers 
XX     
No Smoking 430.33 (208.58) 424.10 (132.59) 433.56 (185.53) 423.10 (132.18) 
Smoking 543.34 (378.41) 569.37 (388.04) 512.53 (296.14) 467.21 (183.41) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
542.92 (310.92) 552.37 (341.15) 544.21 (353.68) 515.04 (269.21) 
X_     
No Smoking 424.88 (198.08) 408.79 (127.06) 418.14 (168.33) 412.43 (127.06) 
Smoking 596.34 (450.36) 555.81 (383.39) 526.17 (328.19) 468.23 (243.92) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
582.01 (400.58) 542.77 (355.57) 566.93 (387.32) 534.12 (332.64) 
_ X     
No Smoking 488.99 (211.72) 474.40 (171.02) 478.14 (180.15) 468.23 (124.98) 
Smoking 631.14 (396.77) 588.22 (345.85) 559.27 (283.34) 531.03 (249.96) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
601.91 (393.72) 571.58 (336.76) 590.30 (359.75) 540.96 (211.61) 
XO     
No Smoking 451.99 (157.56) 458.39 (172.43) 474.54 (198.43) 463.36 (143.10) 
Smoking 594.26 (409.60) 563.73 (340.79) 555.10 (334.35) 502.33 (219.76) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
559.44 (326.16) 537.85 (272.04) 612.29 (377.03) 551.38 (313.75) 
OX     
No Smoking 545.27 (221.74) 534.42 (198.60) 514.94 (198.15) 531.18 (202.20) 
Smoking 678.42 (392.42) 652.90 (396.76) 601.85 (308.34) 592.52 (274.95) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
643.53 (367.65) 629.94 (326.52) 633.16 (374.55) 603.32 (268.27) 
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Non-Smokers Light Smokers Moderate 
Smokers 
Daily Smokers Non-Smokers 
OO     
No Smoking 503.72 (186.56) 488.86 (161.93) 509.32 
(184009) 
481.68 (151.66) 
Smoking 622.62 (387.79) 590.82 (355.16) 575.35 
(303.701) 
530.50 (202.70) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
605.74 (310.70) 576.91 (335.62) 617.80 (389.68) 582.15 (299.92) 
O_     
No Smoking 517.25 (200.04) 505.92 (164.72) 526.41 (173.51) 506.04 (148.86) 
Smoking 659.94 (378.58) 629.95 (364.51) 588.42 (317.26) 550.98 (257.40) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
652.92 (355.96) 612.56 (351.08) 617.20 (344.96) 596.09 (315.84) 
_O      
No Smoking 510.96 (207.54) 466.80 (132.70) 488.24 (193.09) 476.86 (185.78) 
Smoking 645.17 (384.16) 590.41 (357.63) 556.68 (327.92) 530.21 (246.62) 
Pseudo-
Smoking 
642.05 (386.59) 579.46 (313.27) 628.30 (387.35) 572.55 (299.95) 
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Table 4.  
 
F Values for Smoking Group X Smoking Condition Interactions  
 
Stimulus configuration 
 
F value 
 
p value 
XX F (5.5, 3164.39) = 3.18 0.005 
X_ F (5.34, 3179.26) = 3.70 0.002 
_X F (5.60, 3230.62) = 2.27 0.038 
XO F (5.57, 3266.35) = 5.06 0.001 
OX F (5.76, 3286.49) = 2.14 0.049 
OO F (5.49, 3209.37) = 2.37 0.032 
O_ F (5.55, 3162.21) = 3.18 0.005 
_O  F (5.43, 3144.41) = 3.28 0.005 
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Figure 16. Smoking Group by Condition Interaction 
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Figure 16. Smoking Group by Condition Interaction
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Table 5.  
 
Significant Q-values for Simple Main Effects 
 
 Non-Smokers Light Smokers Moderate 
Smokers 
Daily Smokers 
No Smoking vs. 
Smoking 
    
XX 7.55 7.76 6.44 3.46 
X_ 10.50 10.03 7.966 3.92 
_X 9.91 8.55 6.57 4.89 
XO 9.85 8.06 6.59 3.11 
OX 8.56 8.69 6.90 4.64 
OO 7.93 7.53 5.26 3.75 
O_ 9.07 8.91 6.98 3.36 
_O 8.56 8.78 5.27 3.85 
     
No Smoking vs. 
Pseudosmoking 
    
XX 7.58 6.86 9.03 7.21 
X_ 9.63 9.14 10.97 8.54 
_X 7.87 7.30 9.12 5.66 
XO 7.44 6.08 11.27 7.01 
OX 6.32 7.01 9.38 5.45 
OO 6.81 6.51 8.64 7.73 
O_ 8.63 7.67 4.78 6.73 
_O 8.36 8.00 10.78 6.90 
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 Non-Smokers Light Smokers Moderate 
Smokers 
Daily Smokers 
Smoking vs. 
Pseudosmoking 
    
 
XX 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
3.75 
X_ ns ns 3.01 4.63 
_X ns ns ns ns 
XO ns ns 4.68 3.89 
OX ns ns 2.48 ns 
OO ns ns 3.38 3.97 
O_ ns ns ns 3.35 
_O ns ns 5.51 3.05 
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Discussion 
 
The purpose of the current analysis was to compare the conclusions reached based on a 
traditional analysis of variance of the mean reaction times to the conclusions based on 
capacity coefficients and ratios of the reaction time data.  Overall, the main conclusions 
reached on the basis of the two types of analyses were similar.  Smoking did not appear 
to be automatic for any of the smoking groups, including the daily smokers. Reactions 
times were significantly faster in the non-smoking condition than in the smoking 
condition for all of the groups for all of the stimulus presentation types.   
Reaction times for the pseudosmoking condition were significantly slower than the non-
smoking condition for all groups for all of stimulus configurations.   
 
In terms of determining whether smoking was automatic the most relevant finding was 
that for daily smokers, reaction times in the no smoking conditions were significantly 
faster than in the smoking condition.  If smoking were automatic, it would be expected 
that there would be no difference between the smoking and no smoking condition in these 
experienced smokers, thus the results did not support the hypothesis.  These results are 
consistent with the previous analysis that the capacity ratios were less than 1 when 
comparing capacity requirements for the smoking condition in comparison to the no 
smoking condition. This is not consistent with Baxter & Hinson‟s (2001) conclusion that 
smoking was an automatic process.  
 
The main differences between the conclusions reached with the traditional ANOVA and 
capacity ratios is that the capacity ratios relates to conclusions involving the 
pseudosmoking and smoking conditions.  In Analysis 1, there was a clear difference 
between groups in capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and smoking conditions.  
Non- and light smokers had capacity ratios greater than 1, whereas the moderate and 
daily smokers had capacity ratios less than 1.  This is direct evidence that the inhalation 
of smoke was mentally taxing for the less experienced smokers, and the cessation of this 
behaviour was mentally taxing for more experienced smokers.  This suggested that 
smoking itself may be made up of distinct components, each of which may distinctively 
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impact capacity.  This led to the suggestion in Analysis 1 that smoking may best be 
studied from a features-based or component approach as compared to viewing it as a 
unitary behavior.   
 
In the present analysis, there was no evidence of a difference between pseudosmoking 
and nonsmoking for non- and light smokers. If results were only based on the ANOVA 
approach, the conclusion would be that performance was similarly impaired in both 
smoking and pseudosmoking conditions for non- and light smokers. There is no 
indication that the exclusion of the requirement to inhale smoke was beneficial for these 
less experienced smokers in terms of mental processing.  The comparisons from the 
present analysis between the smoking and pseudosmoking condition for the moderate and 
daily smokers were more similar to those using capacity ratios.  However, without the 
comparison of the non- and light smokers, this result is much less informative, and would 
not have led to any speculation about viewing smoking from a component view, as 
compared to a unitary view.    
 
Another shortcoming of the ANOVA approach is that there are limitations in the type of 
post-hoc comparisons that can be made. If an interaction is significant, a researcher must 
decide whether they want to test for differences between variable A keeping variable B 
constant, or test for differences between variable B, keeping A constant (Gardner, 2001). 
Sometimes this choice is clear depending on the research question, however it may be 
difficult to decide which comparisons are most relevant. By using capacity ratios, it was 
possible to consider both smoking conditions and smoking groups when making 
comparisons. As described in the preceding paragraph, the finding that capacity ratios 
comparing the pseudosmoking and smoking conditions were different between smoking 
groups provided valuable data that were not present in the ANOVA.  
 
Another difference between the two approaches is the comparison of differences between 
groups and between conditions.  Within traditional analysis, conclusions are based on 
whether there are significant differences.  If the p value is significant, the results can be 
interpreted as different between variables of interest.  The mathematical approach does 
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not tend to take this approach.  Conclusions are broader, addressing more general 
questions such as whether capacity is limited, unlimited, or super.  While between group 
differences can be quite evident, in the case of one group displaying limited capacity and 
the other showing super capacity, differences between actual capacity ratios are not 
routinely examined.  This difference may be due to the fact that no standard comparisons 
for capacity ratios have been established.  Practically speaking, very few researchers in 
psychology use these mathematical methods, and there may simply be no demand for 
such measures.  However, this lack of comparison could be frustrating for the 
traditionally trained researcher in psychology.    
 
A very relevant barrier to the more widespread use of mathematical approaches in 
comparison to the traditional ANOVA is its perceived inaccessibility. Most researchers in 
psychology are not exposed to this type of analysis, and it may be relatively daunting to 
those without a strong background in mathematics.  However, as the results of the current 
studies suggest, findings that are not accessible by traditional statistical methods may 
remain undiscovered if apprehension about mathematical modeling discourages its use.    
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Analysis 3 
 
Smoking and alcohol use often occur together (Strine et al., 2005).  Smokers are more 
likely to drink alcohol, and alcohol drinkers are more likely to smoke (Dawson, 2000).  
This co-occurrence of alcohol drinking and smoking may be a result of numerous factors.  
There are common factors that increase the risk of alcohol and cigarette use such as 
parental substance use, peer group use, and availability of drugs and alcohol.  The well-
established co-use of drugs and alcohol may have implications when considering the 
cognitive processing involved in smoking behaviour. The presence of alcohol may have 
an impact on how smoking behaviour develops from a mental processing perspective, 
due to alcohol‟s impact on learning. 
 
Alcohol has been found to impair the encoding of new information (Chechile, 2010). If 
smoking mainly occurs in the presence of alcohol, it is possible that the steps that are 
required in order to smoke are learned in a less efficient manner than if smoking occurs 
largely without the co-use of alcohol. This may impact the capacity requirements when 
needing to enact or inhibit the smoking behavior. High co-users of alcohol and cigarettes 
may need to engage more cognitive resources than low co-users when smoking.  
 
State dependent learning has been supported for alcohol use (Goodwin et al., 1969; 
Weingartner, et al., 1976).  Information that is learned under intoxication is better 
recalled under intoxication in comparison to sobriety.  Individuals who use cigarettes 
mostly under the influence of alcohol, may have difficulties smoking while sober. 
Capacity requirements may be strained to perform a behaviour that is normally performed 
under alcohol use conditions.  
 
While alcohol itself may have an impact on the learning of smoking behaviour, the 
consumption patterns of cigarette and alcohol co-users may also have an impact on the 
learning of smoking behaviour.  Individuals who have a strong association between 
alcohol and cigarette use may have different patterns of cigarette consumption than those 
who exhibit more independence between the two behaviors.   For example, it is lighter, 
77 
 
 
non-daily smokers who are most likely to smoke only when consuming alcohol 
(Krukowski et al., 2005).  Low-level smokers are more likely to endorse social motives 
for smoking than heavier smokers (Shiffman et al., 1992; 1994b), and this may also be 
the case for high alcohol and cigarette co-users who tend to be light smokers.  The 
situations in which high co-users smoke are typically more social, thus smoking in 
nonsocial contexts may be inconsistent with their usual smoking experience.  
 
Given that alcohol use may impact learning of smoking behaviours, state dependent 
learning can occur with alcohol, and that light smokers are more likely to be high co-
users of alcohol and cigarettes, it is worth investigating whether this relationship does 
have an impact on capacity ratios.  In Analysis 1, light smokers were identified solely on 
the basis of their cigarette consumption in the previous 30 days. This grouping did not 
take into consideration alcohol and cigarette co-use.  If a large proportion of these light 
smokers were also high alcohol co-users, then their performance of the reaction time task 
could have been affected since the task took place under non-alcohol conditions.  There 
may also be differences between moderate and daily smokers with different alcohol and 
cigarette co-use patterns.  However, the smoking behaviour of more regular smokers is 
less consistently coupled with alcohol, and the absence of alcohol during the reaction 
time task may be less impactful than would be true for lighter smokers.   
   
The goal of the current analysis is to explore the relationship between cigarette smoking 
and alcohol use, and its impact on capacity ratios.  The main focus is to explore capacity 
ratios in individuals with equal consumptions patterns, and different alcohol and cigarette 
coupling patterns.  It is hypothesized that a large proportion of light smokers will use 
cigarettes and alcohol together.  If this is the case their performance on the reaction time 
task should be more greatly impaired, as the smoking is not taking placing under their 
usual smoking circumstances, i.e. while drinking alcohol. These differences may also 
occur among heavier smokers who differ in their coupling patterns of alcohol and 
cigarettes, but since there is more independence between smoking and drinking in regular 
smokers the effects may be less prominent. 
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Method 
 
Data from Analysis 1 were used for the current analysis.   Alcohol use variables were 
created from the Timeline Followback Interview.  When completing the TLFB calendar 
participants were asked to indicate both the number of standard drinks they had on each 
day for the last 30 days, in addition to the number of cigarettes they smoked per day. The 
number of smoking only days, drinking only days, smoking and drinking days, total 
smoking days, total drinking days and no smoking or drinking days were calculated and 
used to identify participants with respect to alcohol/smoking co-use patterns.    
 
       Results 
 
Only participants who smoked in the last 30 days were used in the present analysis since 
it involved smoking and alcohol co-use.  Participants who had smoked in the last 30 days 
were grouped according to the criteria used in Analysis 1: light smokers smoked from 1-
14 days, moderate smokers smoked from 16-29 days, and daily smokers smoked every 
day.  The mean number of smoking only, drinking only, smoking and drinking, no 
drinking and no smoking days can be found in Table 6.  Not surprisingly, there were 
significant differences between groups for all of the variables. Light smokers had a 
significantly higher number of no smoking/no drinking days than moderate smokers.  The 
daily smokers were not included in this analysis as they had 0 no smoking/no drinking 
days.  There were significant differences between groups on smoking/drinking days.  
Post-hoc tests using Tukey‟s HSD indicated that light smokers had significantly fewer of 
these days than the other two smoking groups.  Similarly, the light smokers had fewer 
smoking/no drinking days than did the other two groups.  The light smokers had a higher 
number of no smoking/drinking days than did the moderate smokers.  Again, the daily 
smokers were excluded from this analysis as they had 0 no smoking/drinking days. 
 
Smokers in the different smoking groups were classified as low or high cigarette and 
alcohol co-users based on the proportion of days in which they co-used in relation to all 
smoking days.  The number and proportion of smokers in each of these groups can be  
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Table 6. 
 
Mean Number and Standard Deviation of Co-Use Days for All Smoking Groups 
 
 Light Smokers 
(n=25) 
Moderate 
Smokers 
(n=29) 
Daily Smokers 
(n=26) 
No Smoking/No 
Drinking
1 
19.24 
(3.89) 
3.48 
(3.66) 
 
0 
Smoking/Drinking
2 
4.68 
(3.64) 
8.14 
(5.03) 
7.9615 
(4.72) 
 
Smoking/No 
Drinking
3 
1.44 
(1.66) 
16.66 
(3.65) 
22.00 
(4.67) 
 
No 
Smoking/Drinking
4 
3.76 
(3.32) 
0.69 
(1.58) 
0 
 
1
t (52) = 15.33, p < .001 
2
F (2,77) = 105.93, p < .001 
3
F (2,77) = 23.55, p < .001 
4
t (33.24) = 4.23, p < .001  
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found in Table 7.  Low co-users were defined as participants who coupled alcohol and 
cigarettes on 0-40% of all smoking occasions.  High co-users were those participants who 
coupled alcohol and cigarettes on 60-100% of all smoking occasions.  This operational 
definition was most consistent with a naturally occurring separation in the data, 
maintained a distinct difference between groups, and retained 71 of 80 possible 
participants.  In order to have a sufficient number of reaction times to calculate capacity 
ratios, moderate and high smokers who were high co-users were combined into a single 
group.  This resulted in five groups: light smokers/low co-user, light smokers/high co-
user, moderate smokers/low co-user, daily smokers/low co-user, and moderate and daily 
smokers/high co-user.  Observed bin proportions, estimated survivor functions and 
integrated hazard functions can be found in Tables 23-37 in Appendix B.  
 
Capacity ratios for the stimulus configurations can be found in Figures 17-24. The graphs 
in the top panels represent the capacity ratios comparing smoking and no smoking ratios, 
the graphs in the middle panel represent capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and 
no smoking, and the bottom panels represent capacity ratios for the 
pseudosmoking/smoking conditions. 
 
Across stimulus configurations, capacity ratios comparing smoking and no smoking were 
less than 1, indicating that smoking was capacity taxing.  This is consistent with the 
results of Analysis 1.  Overall, the light smokers/high co-users tended to have the lowest 
capacity ratios, indicating that smoking was most capacity taxing for this group. The light 
smokers/low co-users had higher capacity ratios, overall, than did the light smokers/high 
co-users.  There were no striking differences between the moderate smokers and 
daily/low co-users and the moderate and daily smokers/high co-users except in the X_ 
configurations.  The high co-users had the second lowest capacity ratios consistently, 
whereas the daily smokers/low co-users had the highest. 
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Table 7. 
 
Number and Proportion of Low and High Cigarette and Alcohol Co-Users Among 
Smoking Groups 
 Low co-users High co-users 
Light Smokers 5 (20%) 19 (72%) 
Moderate Smokers 20 (72.4%) 5 (13.8%) 
Daily Smokers 21 (80.8%) 1 (3.8%) 
Note:  For purposes of analysis the moderate and daily high co-users were combined into 
a single group. 
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Figure 17. Capacity ratios for XX configuration 
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Figure 18.  Capacity Ratio for X_ Configuration  
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Figure 19.  Capacity Ratio for _X Configuration 
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Figure 20. Capacity Ratios for XO Configuration 
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Figure 21. OX configuration 
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Figure 22. O_ configuration 
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Figure 23. _O configuration 
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Capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and smoking conditions were consistently less 
than 1 across stimulus configurations, indicating limited capacity.  The only exception 
was for the OX configuration, in which the moderate and daily smokers/high co-users 
had capacity ratios around 1 in the 0-400 ms bin, indicating unlimited capacity.  
  
The capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and smoking did differ between smoking 
groups.  Overall, the light smokers/high co-users had capacity ratios greater than 1 
(particularly evident in the XX and X_ configurations), indicating that smoking taxed 
greater capacity than did pseudosmoking.  The capacity demands of pseudosmoking were 
less than that of smoking.  For light smokers/low co-users the results were less consistent 
across stimulus configurations.  For some configurations, such as XX and X_, capacity 
ratios were less than 1.  However, for other configurations, capacity ratios were greater 
than 1.  There was no clear pattern for this group.  For the moderate and daily smokers, 
who were low alcohol and cigarette co-users, the capacity ratios tended to be lower than 
1, indicating limited capacity. Inconsistent results were found for the moderate and daily 
smokers/high co-users across stimulus configurations. 
 
Discussion 
 
The goal of the current analysis was to examine whether participants who were high co-
users of alcohol and cigarettes had a different pattern of capacity ratios than those who 
did not co-use alcohol and cigarettes with regularity.  It was very clear that light smokers 
within the current sample had a very high rate of alcohol and cigarette coupling.  Over 
70% of these smokers used cigarettes in conjunction with alcohol more than sixty percent 
of the time that they used cigarettes.  It was hypothesized that these alcohol and cigarette 
high co-users may differ from light smokers who did not couple cigarettes and alcohol 
with such a high frequency.  More specifically, it was hypothesized that the high co-users 
would have lower capacity ratios than the low co-users, as they were performing the 
reaction time test under conditions, i.e., no alcohol, that did not mimic their usual 
cigarette consumption.  This hypothesis was supported.  Light smokers who coupled 
cigarettes and alcohol frequently tended to have the lowest capacity ratios when 
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comparing smoking and no smoking conditions.   
 
This difference in capacity ratios between the two groups of light smokers may be for a 
number of reasons.  Light smokers who were high co-users may have been disadvantaged 
due to state dependent learning. If the majority of their smoking occurs under alcohol use 
conditions, it is reasonable to believe that their recall of smoking behaviour would be 
poorer due to the lack of alcohol use during the reaction time task. One way to investigate 
this possibility would be to replicate the study including the use of alcohol as a condition.  
It would be interesting to investigate whether capacity ratios do increase if light 
smoker/high co-users are able to drink alcohol when smoking.  If state dependent 
learning was a factor, one would expect that the light smokers/high co-users capacity 
ratios under alcohol conditions would be equivalent to those of the light smokers/low co-
users under no drinking conditions. 
 
Another possible reason for the poorer performance of the light smoking/high co-users is 
that the presence of alcohol during the normal course of smoking has impaired the 
learning of smoking behaviour. Again, by employing a condition that incorporates 
alcohol use, it would be possible to compare capacity ratios under alcohol use and no 
alcohol use conditions.  If capacity ratios for light smokers/high co-users remained low 
under alcohol conditions, then this may indicate that it is the encoding of smoking 
behaviour that is impacted by alcohol, and not the retrieval conditions. 
 
These possibilities highlight the differences between encoding and retrieval of 
information, a key distinction in memory research.  Based on Tulving‟s encoding 
specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) the two processes appear quite similar.  
Items that are encoded in a specific way are best retrieved under similar circumstances.  
However, research using the dual-task paradigm has highlighted dramatic differences 
between the two processes.  Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge and Thomson (1984) 
demonstrated that a secondary task performed while encoding information affected later 
memory performance, whereas performing the same secondary task during the retrieval 
phase had virtually no effect.  Encoding novel information appears to be an attention 
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intensive activity, whereas retrieval is not.  It has been posited that encoding is an 
intensive attention-requiring process, whereas recall is automatic. 
 
In the example of alcohol and cigarette co-use, it is possible that alcohol is a factor in 
both encoding and retrieval.   If smoking behaviour is learned while using alcohol, this 
may impact the encoding of the steps required in order to smoke.  As previously 
discussed, smoking is comprised of numerous behavioural components.  The coupling of 
cigarettes and alcohol may impact the learning of all of these, or possibly, only some of 
these steps.  The capacity ratios that compared pseudosmoking and smoking behaviour 
were mostly greater than one for light smokers who frequently couple alcohol and 
cigarettes together, suggesting that the inhalation of smoke was a key behavioural 
component that required mental processing.  It is possible that alcohol does interfere with 
the learning of this behavioural component.  This makes intuitive sense as inhaling smoke 
is a very novel behaviour, whereas the motor arm movements in order to bring the 
cigarette to and from the mouth are relatively common.  People learn how to bring things 
to their mouths, such as food or drink, from a very young age, so that component of 
smoking behaviour may be less cognitively taxing.   
 
The results of the current analysis did replicate the findings of Analysis 1 in regards to 
the capacity ratios comparing the pseudosmoking and no smoking conditions.  Overall, 
the ratios were less than 1, indicating that pseudosmoking is capacity tax in comparison 
to no smoking.  Again, it is impossible to say why capacity is limited for all groups, 
regardless of smoking group and alcohol and cigarette co-use. 
 
The capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and smoking were inconsistent across 
stimulus configurations.  The light smokers/high co-users tended to have capacity ratios 
greater than 1, indicating that pseudosmoking was less capacity taxing than smoking.  
This is consistent with the conclusion of Analysis 1, in that light smokers tended to show 
super capacity between these two conditions.  Light smokers/low co-users however, were 
more inconsistent.  For some stimulus configurations capacity ratios were greater than 1, 
and for other stimulus configurations, capacity ratios were less than 1.  These 
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inconsistencies may be due to the fact that response times were only available for 5 
individuals who were both light smokers and low co-users.  The results may be more 
stable if a greater sample size was available.  The inconsistency may also suggest that 
results are dependent on stimulus configurations, however there was no clear pattern to 
capacity ratios across different types of configurations (i.e. presentations including X or 
O).  These inconsistencies may also suggest that light smokers/low co-users are an 
oddity.  This group is composed of individuals who do not smoke on a regular basis, and 
their smoking is not related to drinking alcohol.  Their smoking may be very different, 
from both a behavioural and mental processing perspective, than other groups.  Of 
course, this is speculative and further research is needed in order to assess characteristics 
of this type of smoker. 
 
Capacity ratios for the pseudosmoking and smoking conditions for moderate and daily 
smokers tended to be less than 1, regardless of co-use status.  This replicates that results 
of Analysis 1, in that more experienced smokers tended to require greater capacity in 
order to cease the smoking behaviour.  Daily smokers/low co-users tended to have the 
most consistent results, indicating limited capacity, but there were some anomalies in 
these findings.  This was similar to the findings for the moderate smokers/low co-users.   
 
The findings for the moderate and daily smokers/high co-users did not have a clear 
pattern of findings, with an almost equivalent mixture of capacity ratios less than, equal 
to, or greater than 1.   As with the light smokers/low co-users, this was a relatively small 
group with only 6 participants included.  Caution should be exercised in the interpretation 
of the results.  The inconsistencies in results may again suggest that this group is quite 
different than other smokers. If state dependent learning is a factor, these smokers may 
perform more consistently under alcohol use conditions.  If capacity ratios increased 
under alcohol use conditions, then this would provide evidence for state dependent 
learning.  If capacity ratios remained the same however, this would indicate that alcohol 
may be interfering with learning smoking behaviour, even after a great deal of smoking 
experience.  This would suggest that alcohol use itself is a more powerful influence on 
learning then experience.   
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There are significant limitations to the current analysis.  It is unknown whether smoking 
behaviour was initially learned solely under high alcohol and cigarette co-use situations.  
Information about alcohol and cigarette co-use was only collected for the previous 30 
days, and it is impossible to know whether smoking learning occurred only under alcohol 
use conditions.  A prospective study tracking smoking and alcohol use through 
adolescence and young adulthood would provide a better assessment of the co-use of 
alcohol and cigarettes, and how this impacts capacity.  If it was certain that initial 
smoking behavior solely took place while using alcohol, more definitive conclusions 
could be made about the impact of alcohol on learning smoking behavior.  This would 
also potentially help clarify whether alcohol is impacting encoding or retrieval.   
 
The current analysis is only a starting point in considering the relationship between 
alcohol use and its potential impact on the learning of smoking behaviour.  It also cannot 
be ignored that both alcohol and cigarettes have both individual and combined 
physiological effects, which may impact learning of smoking behaviour.  It would be 
simplistic to conclude that it is only the combined presence of alcohol and nicotine that 
may have an impact on learning. Clearly there is a great deal of further research that is 
required in order to clarify the relationship between alcohol use, cigarettes, and capacity 
ratios. 
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General Discussion 
  
The goals of the current series of analyses were numerous.  The main focus was to 
investigate whether smoking was an automatic process, using capacity as an indicator of 
automatic processing.  By utilizing mathematical modeling, it was hoped to more clearly 
identify differences in the mental processing that occurred in different types of smokers 
under various smoking conditions.  These conclusions reached on the basis of the 
mathematical methods were then compared to conclusions made from traditional analysis 
of variance, to investigate whether capacity ratios and coefficients did provide more 
information about performance under the different smoking conditions.  Finally, capacity 
ratios were compared between individuals who frequently coupled alcohol and cigarettes 
and those who were infrequent couplers.  Given alcohol‟s possible effects on both 
encoding and retrieval of information, it was posited that the mental processing of 
individuals who coupled alcohol and cigarettes frequently may be different in comparison 
to low frequency co-users. 
  
Overall, it appears that smoking, regardless of the level of smoking experience of 
smokers in the current study, does make demands on cognitive processing. Results using 
both capacity measures and analysis of variance supported this conclusion. Capacity 
ratios comparing cognitive processing requirements for the smoking condition and no 
smoking conditions where consistently less than 1, indicating limited capacity.  Results 
using a traditional ANOVA also indicated that reaction times were significantly faster in 
the no smoking condition in comparison to the smoking condition, regardless of smoking 
group.  Whether one uses capacity as an indicator of automaticity or uses mean reaction 
times as a measure of automaticity the overall results do not support the idea that 
smoking had become automatic, even in the daily smokers.   
  
Capacity ratios did increase with increased smoking experience.  While the non-smokers 
capacity ratios ranged from 0.44-0.72, daily smokers‟ capacity ratios ranged from 0.5-
0.88.  This increase in capacity ratios suggest that with increased smoking experience, 
mental processing requirements for engaging in smoking behaviour are reduced.  The 
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current sample had relatively low daily consumption rates and low dependence levels in 
comparison to other samples of smokers, so it would be worthwhile to replicate the 
current study with heavier smokers. 
  
The pseudosmoking condition was also consistently, regardless of analysis type, found to 
be cognitively taxing for all smoking groups. When capacity ratios were calculated 
comparing cognitive demands for pseudosmoking compared to no smoking, the ratios 
were less than 1 for all groups. Similarly, reaction times were significantly slower in the 
pseudosmoking condition than in the no smoking condition. While one may argue that 
there were different reasons among groups for the reduced performances in the 
pseudosmoking condition, there is no direct evidence for this. 
  
In Analysis 1, capacity ratios comparing pseudosmoking and smoking revealed 
differences between smoking groups.  For non- and light smokers, capacity ratios were 
greater than one, indicating super capacity.  When the demand to complete the smoking 
behaviour was eliminated, mental processing was improved.  For moderate and daily 
smokers, capacity ratios were less than one, indicating limited capacity. The cessation of 
smoking behaviour taxed mental processing. This difference in capacity ratios seems to 
highlight that there may be components of smoking behaviour that are more capacity 
taxing then others.  These results suggested that it may be prudent to utilize a feature 
based approach to the study of smoking behaviour.   
 
 Capacity ratios were also utilized to investigate the relationship between alcohol and 
cigarette co-use.  Smokers are more likely to use alcohol than non-smokers, and light 
smokers in particular are more likely to smoke in the presence of alcohol than to smoke 
independently of alcohol use.  This was found to be the case in the current sample.  A 
vast majority of light smokers frequently coupled alcohol and cigarettes.  Conversely, 
very few moderate and daily smokers were high co-users of cigarettes and alcohol.  
 
When examining capacity ratios among high and low co-users, differences were found in 
the cognitive demands of the various smoking conditions. In Analysis 1, light smokers 
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were found to display super capacity when comparing pseudosmoking and smoking. 
However, in Analysis 3 when smokers were distinguished according to level of co-use of 
alcohol and smoking, only light smokers who were high co-users showed super capacity. 
Light smokers who were low co-users, displayed more inconsistent patterns of results.   
 
These inconsistencies in capacity ratios may have been due to the small sample size of 
light smokers/low co-users, or an indication that this group is a unique group in their 
capacity demands.  It would be interesting, although incredibly difficult, to capture 
moment to moment capacity demands of smoking.  It may be that smoking impacts 
capacity differently depending on what component of smoking behaviour a person is 
engaging in.  Given the overall differences between smoking groups in capacity ratios 
comparing pseudosmoking and smoking conditions, this indicates a difference in mental 
processing during various parts of the smoking behaviour.  It would also be interesting to 
examine whether smoking of the first half of the cigarette impacts capacity differently 
than the second half.  Light smokers especially may need some time to get accustomed to 
smoking a cigarette.   It would be interesting to study whether mental processing changes 
over the course of smoking a cigarette. 
  
Awareness of Automatic Behaviours 
  
Despite the fact that cognitive capacity is taxed during smoking, smokers themselves 
describe smoking as automatic (Johnson et al., 2005).   Smoking may be experienced as 
automatic if the cognitive resources that are required for smoking are so minimal that 
they are not consciously noticed by the smoker.  Smoking is not perceived by the smoker 
as needing attention.  However, as this research does indicate, cognitive capacity is 
required in order to smoke.  This need for cognitive awareness is problematic when 
considering that smokers often engage in other activities while smoking.  
  
In utilizing the capacity coefficients, it was found that different types of stimulus 
configurations impacted capacity in different ways.  Double targets limited capacity in 
comparison to the sum of single targets, whereas the comparison of double non-targets to 
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single non-targets indicated super capacity.  Despite the differences in mental processing 
requirements for the different stimulus configurations, the pattern of capacity ratios for 
smoking groups remained consistent across stimulus configurations.  These results 
suggested that the complexity of the secondary task does not appear to impact the 
cognitive requirements of smoking behaviour.  This is relevant, as smokers perform 
numerous secondary tasks while engaging in smoking behaviour.  They drive cars, have 
conversations, drink and eat, and engage in numerous other activities while smoking.  
The capacity coefficient results suggest that the mental requirements of the secondary 
task do not modulate the mental capacity requirements for smoking behaviour.  Smoking 
may require the same amount of processing whether someone is doing something 
relatively simple, or something more complex.   
  
It is of concern that smokers engage in many types of secondary behaviours while 
smoking, without realizing that smoking requires some level of mental processing.  Many 
smokers engage in complex tasks such as driving a car.  While the deleterious effects of 
alcohol, marijuana, and other substances on driving are well established, cigarette 
smoking has been widely ignored. This oversight is likely due to the fact that cigarettes 
are not thought to be debilitating like other substances.  However, the current research 
suggests that it is not only intoxicating effects of substances that are a concern, but also 
the mental processing resources that they require.  Studies that examine drivers‟ response 
times under smoking conditions would be beneficial in understanding the effect smoking 
cigarettes has on driving. 
   
  Capacity and Smoking Groups 
  
For the current series of studies, participants were grouped based on smoking in the last 
30 days; non-smokers, light smokers, moderate smokers and daily smokers. These groups 
differed not only in number of days smoked in the last 30 days, but also in demographics, 
smoking histories, and dependence levels. This manner of classifying smokers is 
consistent with other research that used discrete categories of smoking such as never, 
former, and current (Martini, Wagner, & Anthony, 2002). Other methods of studying 
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smoking status include single question rating scales ranging from never smoked a 
cigarette to two packs a day (Repetto et al., 2005), to more detailed methods such as 
estimating daily number of cigarettes smoked for each year that a participant has smoked 
(Baxter & Hinson, 2001). While these methods can be quite useful, other methods of 
classifying smokers should be explored.  
  
Defining typologies of smokers is a vital, yet underdeveloped, component of smoking 
research.   Identifying subtypes of smoking groups may be beneficial in understanding 
smoking behaviour and providing treatment to stop the behaviour.  Group subtypes have 
been found in alcoholism (Babor et al., 1992), opiate use (Zinberg & Johnson, 1976), and 
even gambling behaviour (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002).  These subtypes have proven to 
be useful in conceptualizing these behaviours, as well as treating them.  For example, 
Type A alcoholics, defined as those with a later age of onset of alcohol problems, fewer 
childhood risk factors and fewer psychiatric symptoms, have shown better treatment 
response rates using SSRI„s than Type B alcoholics, those with who earlier onset of 
alcohol problems, more childhood risk factors and more psychiatric problems (Dundon, 
Lynch, Pettinati, & Lipkin, 2004).   
  
The current analyses supported a classification system that incorporates alcohol co-use: 
differences in capacity ratios that were not evident in Analysis 1 were found among 
smoking groups when alcohol co-use was considered in Analysis 3.  This suggests that 
classifying smokers on smoking variables alone may not be adequate.  There are likely 
numerous other variables that may be used to distinguish smokers who have the same 
level of smoking.  However, within the current context of mental processing, it appears 
that alcohol co-use is a very important consideration. 
  
In addition to a lack of a standard classification system for smokers, the assessment of the 
emergence of tobacco dependence has been recognized as an important, yet understudied, 
issue in smoking research (Tiffany, Conklin, Shiffman & Clayton, 2004).  There have 
been some proposed stages in smoking development.  These stages include 
contemplation, when an individual begins thinking about smoking, initiation or 
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experimentation with cigarettes, gradual increase in the frequency of smoking, regular 
smoking (less sporadic than previous), and daily/almost daily smoking as the final stage 
(Leventhal & Cleary, 1980).  However, Mayhew, Flay & Mott (2000) found no 
consistent evidence for these stages in the literature.  They suggest that these inconclusive 
findings are due to lack of standard operational definitions of these stages.   
  
As shown by the current research, it appears that the level of cognitive processing that is 
required in order to smoke is related to both smoking experience and level of 
dependence. As the frequency of smoking behavior increased, the cognitive requirements 
for engaging in smoking behavior decreased.  Capacity ratios did increase across 
smoking groups when comparing smoking and no smoking.  The level of cognitive 
processing that is required may be a marker for where on the smoking continuum an 
individual sits. This is consistent with McFall and Townsend‟s (1989) argument that 
mathematical modeling could be a powerful tool in the area of psychological assessment. 
Capacity provides valuable information about a smoker‟s cognitive requirements. This 
information can be garnered without relying on self-report, which is how the bulk of 
information about one‟s smoking status is usually collected.  
  
Another advantage of using capacity measures in the assessment of smoking is that it can 
help conceptualize substance use as a process, rather than a static state. 
Conceptualizations about substance use issues are often categorical and discrete.   
Substance use dependence and abuse, as defined by the DSM-IV-TR (2004), is 
categorical in nature.  One must meet a number of diagnostic criteria in order to receive a 
diagnosis.  Much of the research on addictive behaviours looks at stable factors prior to 
the development of substance use, such as parental substance use, history of deviant 
behaviour, or prior use of other substances (Chassin, Presson, Pitts & Sherman, 2000; 
Juon, Ensminger, & Sydnor, 2002).  While important, these approaches fail to address the 
processes involved in the development of substance use.  The use of capacity measures 
illustrates the process, from a cognitive perspective. With smoking experience, capacity 
measures change.  
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Treatment Implications 
  
The current gold standard for treatment of smoking behaviour is the combination of 
pharmacological interventions, such as Champix or nicotine replacements, and 
behavioural interventions (Mojica et al., 2004). However, quit rates remain relatively 
low.  In addition to the combination of pharmacological treatments and behavioral 
approaches, other quitting strategies include using pharmacological treatments on their 
own, quitting cold turkey, hypnosis, laser therapy, and through sheer willpower. 
However, many of these methods are not scientifically validated, and often have high 
relapse rates.  
  
The fact that smoking does require cognitive resources is positive news in terms of 
treatment implications. If smoking was truly automatic, this could pose difficulties in 
treatment.  Shiffrin & Schneider (1977) found that unlearning an automatic memory 
search set and learning a new search set takes longer than learning the original search set. 
This suggested that the original, automatic set somehow interfered with learning new 
material.  It has also been found that there are changes in brain activity when trying to 
replace previously automatic information with new information (Kubler et al., 2006).  
 
Smokers‟ own beliefs that their smoking is automatic may interfere with their confidence 
that they can quit.  Substance use may be viewed as something outside of a person‟s 
control, which may decrease feelings of self-efficacy in ability to quit the substance use.  
However, if a patient that is trying to quit smoking is informed that smoking does require 
mental processing, this may contradict their beliefs that smoking is automatic.  The need 
for capacity may be used by a treating clinician as an explanation of how mental control 
is required in order to smoke, and that smoking behaviour does not have a life of its own.   
  
Capacity ratios could be used in order to assess if there are cognitive changes that occur 
in the quitting process.  If an individual‟s capacity ratios comparing smoking and no 
smoking increased while they were quitting, this could indicate that smoking is becoming 
“unlearned.”, or at least less automatic.  The ability to show smokers who are trying to 
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quit that there are changes happening, maybe even when overt smoking behavior is not, 
may be very beneficial.  However, if capacity ratios remain unchanged, this may suggest 
that once smoking has developed to the level of heavy use it may have relatively more 
persistent effects on cognitive processing.   
  
Redefining  Controlled and Automatic Processing   
  
While the overarching purpose of the current series of studies was to determine whether 
smoking was an automatic process, it is debatable whether it was truly testing 
“automaticity.”  As previously described, there is no standard and widely accepted 
definition of automatic and controlled processing (Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  While 
these concepts intuitively make sense, and there is no lack of description about this dual 
view of cognitive processing, an empirically validated definition does not exist. For the 
current study, capacity was used as a marker of automaticity.  While capacity is one 
reasonable indicator of automaticity, it is not interchangeable with “automatic 
processing.” 
  
One of the main criticisms of the concepts of controlled and automatic processing is that 
there is no description of the mechanisms underlying the transition from controlled to 
automatic (Birnboim, 2003).  While Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) outline the steps 
involved in the transition from controlled to automatic, these are largely descriptive and 
have not been directly studied.  More recently, Schneider and Chein (2003) have 
proposed a more complex model of controlled and automatic processing, the CAP2. The 
CAP2 attempts to “capture the computational richness of the diverse neuronal assemblies 
that comprise cortical modular columns, which are found to recur throughout the cortex 
with regionally specialized connection patterns”.  While ambitious, this model has not 
been empirically studied or validated. It has been proposed that the automatic/controlled 
distinction is best used to frame an argument about basic information processing rather 
than to provide a detailed description of the processes required in any individual task or 
set of tasks (Birnboim, 2003).    
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One method of examining the transition from controlled to automatic processing would 
be through the use of capacity measures.  Capacity ratios could be used as a baseline 
measure prior to the learning of a task.  As the learning of the task occurs, measuring 
capacity ratios repeatedly could provide information as to how the capacity requirements 
change with practice.  If a new task is initially capacity limiting, a switch to unlimited 
capacity would indicate that a significant level of learning has taken place.  This tracking 
of capacity measures would provide empirical evidence for a transition from a capacity 
limiting process to a more “automatic” one. 
 
 
Mathematical Modeling in Clinical Science 
  
The current status of the use of mathematical modeling in clinical science is limited at 
best.  Reasons for this lack of use are undoubtedly numerous.  One reason would likely 
be limited opportunities for receiving training in psychology research programs.  A lack 
of awareness about these methods also influences the lack of use in mathematical 
modeling.  McFall and Townsend (1998) argue that an integration of clinical and 
cognitive sciences would lead to significant advance in psychological assessment.  One 
of the main goals of this series of studies was to provide a clinically relevant example of 
using these mathematical tools.  
  
Another possible reason for the limited use of mathematical models in clinical science is 
that it has been difficult to conceptualize how one would actually use mathematical 
modeling.  Wading through concepts such as architecture, capacity, and stopping rules 
makes the application of mathematical modeling seem quite limited and specific to 
memory search tasks.  While the current series of studies used a traditional search and 
response task, it provides clinically useful information.  
  
Another example of an application of mathematical modeling, with clinical relevance, 
was a recent study by Johnson, Blaha, Houpt, & Townsend (2010).  This study looked at 
mental processing within a sample of participants diagnosed with autism spectrum 
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disorder (ASD), and a control sample.  Overall, they found that fundamental differences 
in mental processing between the two groups, particularly in regards to stopping rules and 
dependency.  This study highlights the ability to use mathematical modeling in order to 
highlight both strengths and weaknesses among different clinical groups.  In his 
discussion of the Bull-in-a-Worcester-China-Shop syndrome, Maher (1974) argues that 
clinically disturbed populations do poorly on most measures of cognitive ability.  
Evidence that there are deficits in these clinical populations is not difficult to obtain.  
However, this may not necessarily be the most useful information.  What is equally, if not 
more interesting, is what processes are functioning at normal levels.  By obtaining this 
information, clinicians would be able to adapt treatment to take advantage of those 
functioning efficiencies.  However, it is only by using mathematical applications that 
these processes are able to be teased apart.   
  
Future Research 
  
The current series of studies has provided evidence that smoking does tax capacity, but 
capacity demands decrease as smoking experience and dependence levels increase.  
While capacity was used as a marker for automaticity, other components of information 
processing models were not considered.  These components include architecture, 
stopping rules and independence.  Designing experiments that are able to access 
additional mental processing components may provide additional information about the 
cognitive requirements of smoking behaviour. These other mental processes could be 
utilized in order to study smoking as a more feature based approach.  
  
As previously discussed, automatic processing can be considered in relation to the UCIP 
model (Townsend & Wenger, 2004).  The current study has addressed the issue of 
capacity, from a pure insertion perspective.  When smoking behaviour is inserted, it does 
affect the processing of the secondary task.  The processing of the secondary task does 
not fit the UCIP model, as capacity was not unlimited when smoking was inserted, 
regardless of smoking group membership.  However, it remains unknown how the 
insertion of smoking behaviour affects the independence and architecture of the 
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processing of the secondary task.  System‟s Factorial Technology, and its associated 
Double Factorial Design, (Townsend & Ashby, 1983; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995) is an 
experimental approach that allows for the assessment of all components of processing 
within a single experimental design.  Johnson et al. (2010) implemented such a design in 
order to assess all components of information processing models within their ASD 
sample.   
  
In terms of general processing, it would be interesting to study how capacity 
requirements are perceived by individuals.  While smoking does require cognitive 
capacity, smokers do describe their smoking as automatic.  While not directly studied, 
many of the non- and light smokers commented during the task that they felt that 
smoking was very distracting, and it was difficult to do the monitoring task.  It would be 
interesting to more formally study individuals‟ perceptions of effort and their 
corresponding capacity requirements.  There may be a certain capacity cut-off that feels 
“automatic” or “controlled.”  
  
One critical question that may be explored through the use of capacity measures is 
whether there is any single behaviour that is truly “automatic.”  Many behaviours feel as 
if they require no effort or conscious awareness; however it is unknown whether there is 
any behaviour that truly requires no cognitive effort.  Even physiologically automatic 
behaviours, such as breathing, may take a level of cognitive processing that is not 
understood.  Capacity measures, as well as other components of information processing 
systems, could be utilized in order to explore the cognitive processing requirements of 
numerous, seemingly “automatic” behaviours.   
  
In conclusion, the application of capacity measures did add significantly to the 
understanding of the cognitive processes underlying smoking behaviour.  Its use in 
highlighting the importance of studying different components of smoking behaviour 
cannot be minimized.  These capacity measures also provided solid evidence that the 
relationship between cigarettes and alcohol coupling also impacts cognitive processing.  
The use of these measures may be invaluable in better understanding substance use, and 
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should be utilized in future research. 
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Appendix B. 
Table 1.  
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Non-Smokers In Non-Smoking 
Condition 
 
 
0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.908 0.070 0.015 0 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.092 0.022 0.007 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.386 3.817 4.962 4.962 
X _      
Observed proportion 0.898 0.068 0.023 0.005 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.102 0.034 0.011 0.006 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.283 3.381 4.510 5.116 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.773 0.17 0.035 0.008 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.227 0.057 0.022 0.014 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.483 2.865 3.817 4.269 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.810 0.115 0.058 0.013 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.190 0.075 0.017 0.004 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.661 2.590 4.074 5.521 
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0-400 ms 
 
400-600 ms 
 
600-800ms 
 
800-1000ms 
 
OX 
    
Observed proportion 0.625 0.26 0.055 0.035 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.375 0.115 0.06 0.025 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.981 2.163 2.813 3.689 
OO     
Observed Proportion 0.815 0.14 0.018 0.013 
Estimated Survivor 
function 0.185 0.045 0.027 0.014 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.687 3.101 3.612 4.269 
O_     
Observed proportion 0.75 0.183 0.033 0.02 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.25 0.067 0.034 0.014 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 2.703 3.381 4.269 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.768 0.148 0.045 0.02 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.232 0.084 0.039 0.019 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.461 2.477 3.244 3.963 
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Table 2.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Non-Smokers in Smoking 
Condition 
 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.783 0.093 0.033 0.018 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.217 0.124 0.091 0.073 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.528 2.087 2.397 2.617 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.698 0.13 0.045 0.023 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.302 0.172 0.127 0.104 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.197 1.760 2.0636 2.263 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.633 0.183 0.055 0.033 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.367 0.184 0.129 0.096 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.002 1.693 2.048 2.343 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.673 0.135 0.085 0.038 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.327 0.192 0.107 0.069 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.118 1.650 2.235 2.674 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
 
OX 
    
Observed proportion 0.51 0.235 0.093 0.033 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.49 0.255 0.162 0.129 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.713 1.366 1.820 2.048 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.655 0.15 0.075 0.018 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.345 0.195 0.12 0.102 
Integrated hazard  
function 1.0642 1.635 2.120 2.283 
O_     
Observed proportion 0.558 0.238 0.07 0.028 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.442 0.204 0.134 0.106 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.816 1.590 2.010 2.244 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.585 0.23 0.053 0.045 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.415 0.185 0.132 0.087 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.879 1.687 2.025 2.442 
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Table 3.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Non-Smokers in Pseudo-
Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.745 0.123 0.028 0.033 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.255 0.132 0.104 0.071 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.366 2.025 2.263 2.645 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.733 0.095 0.053 0.03 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.267 0.172 0.119 0.089 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.320 1.760 2.129 2.419 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.698 0.158 0.045 0.02 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.302 0.144 0.099 0.079 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.197 1.938 2.313 2.538 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.713 0.13 0.058 0.028 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.287 0.157 0.099 0.071 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.248 1.852 2.313 2.645 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.573 0.218 0.085 0.04 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.427 0.209 0.124 0.084 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.851 1.565 2.087 2.477 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.615 0.205 0.053 0.065 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.385 0.18 0.127 0.062 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.955 1.715 2.066 2.781 
O _     
Observed proportion 0.565 0.223 0.08 0.04 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.435 0.212 0.132 0.092 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.832 1.5512 2.025 2.386 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.59 0.225 0.063 0.04 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.41 0.185 0.122 0.082 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.892 1.687 2.103 2.501 
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Table 4.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Light Smokers in Non-Smoking 
Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.928 0.06 0.006 0 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.072 0.012 0.006 0.006 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.631 4.423 5.116 5.116 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.912 0.072 0.008 0.004 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.088 0.016 0.008 0.004 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.430 4.135 4.828 5.521 
_X     
Observed proportion 0.826 0.15 0.01 0.006 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.174 0.024 0.014 0.008 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.749 3.730 4.269 4.828 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.844 0.124 0.02 0.002 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.156 0.032 0.012 0.01 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.858 3.442 4.423 4.605 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800  ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.8 0.162 0.022 0.006 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.2 0.038 0.016 0.01 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.609 3.270 4.135 4.605 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.757 0.178 0.034 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.243 0.065 0.031 0.017 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.415 2.733 3.474 4.075 
O _     
Observed proportion 0.76 0.19 0.03 0.006 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.24 0.05 0.02 0.014 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.427 2.996 3.912 4.269 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.838 0.126 0.016 0.012 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.162 0.036 0.02 0.008 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.820 3.324 3.912 4.828 
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Table 5.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Light Smokers In Smoking 
Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.72 0.152 0.034 0.02 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.28 0.128 0.094 0.074 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.273 2.056 2.364 2.604 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.722 0.144 0.028 0.018 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.278 0.134 0.106 0.088 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.280 2.010 2.244 2.430 
_X     
Observed proportion 0.67 0.184 0.042 0.022 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.33 0.146 0.104 0.082 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.109 1.924 2.263 2.501 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.72 0.14 0.034 0.036 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.28 0.14 0.106 0.07 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.273 1.966 2.244 2.659 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.684 0.200 0.028 0.022 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.316 0.116 0.088 0.066 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.152 2.154 2.430 2.718 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.655 0.217 0.05 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.345 0.128 0.078 0.064 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.064 2.056 2.551 2.749 
O _     
Observed proportion 0.608 0.222 0.046 0.04 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.392 0.17 0.124 0.084 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.936 1.772 2.087 2.477 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.654 0.206 0.056 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.346 0.14 0.084 0.07 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.061 1.966 2.477 2.659 
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Table 6. 
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Light Smokers In Pseudo -
Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.754 0.124 0.042 0.022 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.246 0.122 0.08 0.058 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.402 2.104 2.526 2.847 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.736 0.12 0.044 0.042 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.264 0.144 0.1 0.058 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.909 1.732 2.207 2.513 
_X     
Observed proportion 0.702 0.168 0.046 0.022 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.298 0.13 0.084 0.062 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.211 2.040 2.477 2.781 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.714 0.16 0.056 0.02 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.286 0.126 0.07 0.05 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.252 2.071 2.659 2.996 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.668 0.232 0.042 0.022 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.332 0.100 0.058 0.036 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.103 2.303 2.847 3.324 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.624 0.202 0.057 0.034 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.376 0.174 0.117 0.083 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.978 1.749 2.146 2.489 
O_     
Observed proportion 0.646 0.19 0.074 0.03 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.354 0.164 0.090 0.06 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.038 1.808 2.408 2.813 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.664 0.184 0.054 0.024 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.336 0.152 0.098 0.074 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.091 1.884 2.323 2.604 
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Table 7.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Moderate Smokers In Non-
Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.883 0.083 0.014 0.009 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.117 0.034 0.02 0.011 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.146 3.381 3.912 4.510 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.903 0.067 0.01 0.007 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.097 0.03 0.02 0.013 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.333 3.507 3.912 4.343 
_X     
Observed proportion 0.802 0.141 0.026 0.016 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.198 0.057 0.031 0.015 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.619 2.865 3.474 4.200 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.803 0.147 0.028 0.009 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.197 0.05 0.022 0.013 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.625 3.00 3.817 4.343 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.726 0.176 0.06 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.274 0.098 0.038 0.024 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.295 2.323 3.270 3.730 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.757 0.178 0.034 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.243 0.065 0.031 0.017 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.415 2.733 3.474 4.074 
O _     
Observed proportion 0.7 0.222 0.053 0.01 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.3 0.078 0.025 0.015 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 2.551 3.689 4.200 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.781 0.162 0.036 0.01 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.219 0.057 0.021 0.011 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.519 2.865 3.863 4.510 
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Table 8.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Moderate Smokers In Smoking 
Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.793 0.103 0.034 0.026 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.207 0.104 0.07 0.044 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.575 2.263 2.660 3.124 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.74 0.141 0.05 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.26 0.119 0.069 0.055 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.347 2.129 2.674 2.900 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.693 0.181 0.053 0.017 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.307 0.126 0.073 0.056 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.181 2.071 2.617 2.882 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.71 0.145 0.06 0.033 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.29 0.145 0.085 0.052 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.238 1.931 2.465 2.957 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.586 0.224 0.079 0.052 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.414 0.19 0.111 0.059 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.882 1.661 2.198 2.830 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.655 0.217 0.05 0.014 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.345 0.128 0.078 0.064 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.064 2.0565 2.551 2.749 
O_     
Observed proportion 0.619 0.25 0.067 0.021 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.381 0.131 0.064 0.043 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.965 2.033 2.749 3.147 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.7 0.171 0.053 0.017 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.3 0.129 0.076 0.059 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 2.048 2.577 2.830 
131 
 
  
  
  
Table 9.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Moderate Smokers In Pseudo -
Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.743 0.148 0.029 0.019 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.257 0.109 0.08 0.061 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.359 2.216 2.526 2.797 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.736 0.103 0.045 0.031 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.264 0.161 0.116 0.085 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.332 1.826 2.154 2.465 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.667 0.179 0.043 0.033 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.333 0.154 0.111 0.078 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.100 1.871 2.198 2.551 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.652 0.162 0.066 0.04 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.348 0.186 0.12 0.08 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.056 1.682 2.120 2.526 
132 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.559 0.24 0.071 0.041 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.441 0.201 0.13 0.089 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.819 1.604 2.040 2.419 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.624 0.202 0.057 0.034 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.376 0.174 0.117 0.083 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.978 1.749 2.146 2.489 
O_     
Observed proportion 0.597 0.226 0.067 0.029 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.403 0.177 0.11 0.081 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.909 1.732 2.207 2.513 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.591 0.212 0.072 0.036 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.409 0.197 0.125 0.089 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.894 1.6245 2.079 2.419 
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Table 10.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Smokers In Non -Smoking 
Condition 
 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.906 0.085 0.004 0 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.094 0.009 0.005 0.005 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.364 4.710 5.298 5.298 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.923 0.052 0.013 0.006 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.077 0.025 0.012 0.006 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.564 3.689 4.423 5.116 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.835 0.142 0.012 0.008 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.165 0.023 0.011 0.003 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.802 3.772 4.510 5.809 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.815 0.158 0.017 0.006 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.185 0.027 0.01 0.004 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.687 3.612 4.605 5.521 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.681 0.24 0.052 0.015 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.319 0.079 0.027 0.012 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.143 2.538 3.612 4.423 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.823 0.146 0.021 0 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.177 0.031 0.01 0.01 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.732 3.474 4.605 4.605 
     
O_     
Observed proportion 0.75 0.194 0.04 0.004 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.25 0.056 0.016 0.012 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 2.882 4.135 4.423 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.84 0.117 0.023 0.012 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.16 0.043 0.02 0.008 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.833 3.147 3.912 4.828 
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Table 11.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Daily Smokers In Smoking 
Condition 
 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.838 0.1 0.033 0.008 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.162 0.062 0.029 0.021 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.820 2.781 3.540 3.863 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.835 0.117 0.019 0.01 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.165 0.048 0.029 0.019 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.802 3.037 3.540 3.963 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.74 0.167 0.038 0.029 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.26 0.093 0.055 0.026 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.347 2.375 2.900 3.650 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.773 0.146 0.04 0.013 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.227 0.081 0.041 0.028 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.483 2.513 3.194 3.576 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.579 0.277 0.071 0.029 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.421 0.144 0.073 0.044 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.865 1.938 2.617 3.124 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.735 0.188 0.031 0.017 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.265 0.077 0.046 0.029 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.328 2.564 3.079 3.540 
O_     
Observed proportion 0.669 0.229 0.052 0.021 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.331 0.102 0.05 0.029 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.106 2.283 2.996 3.540 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.733 0.187 0.037 0.013 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.267 0.08 0.043 0.03 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.321 2.526 3.147 3.507 
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Table 12.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard Functions for Daily Smokers In 
Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed proportion 0.756 0.152 0.031 0.012 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.244 0.092 0.061 0.049 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.411 2.386 2.797 3.016 
X _     
Observed proportion 0.733 0.138 0.054 0.019 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.267 0.129 0.075 0.056 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.321 2.048 2.590 2.882 
_ X     
Observed proportion 0.667 0.225 0.058 0.027 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.333 0.108 0.050 0.023 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.100 2.226 2.996 3.772 
XO     
Observed proportion 0.712 0.173 0.052 0.013 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.288 0.115 0.063 0.05 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.245 2.163 2.765 2.996 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed proportion 0.55 0.252 0.094 0.042 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.45 0.198 0.104 0.062 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.799 1.619 2.263 2.781 
OO     
Observed proportion 0.681 0.212 0.04 0.025 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.319 0.107 0.067 0.042 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.143 2.235 2.703 3.170 
     
O_     
Observed proportion 0.621 0.248 0.06 0.023 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.379 0.131 0.071 0.048 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.970 2.033 2.645 3.0367 
_O     
Observed proportion 0.662 0.204 0.048 0.033 
Estimated survivor 
function 0.338 0.134 0.086 0.053 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.085 2.010 2.453 2.937 
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Table 13.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Complete Sample In Non-Smoking Condition 
 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.905 0.075 0.01 0.003 
Estimated 
survivor 
function 0.095 0.02 0.01 0.007 
Integrated 
Hazard 
Function 2.354 3.912 4.605 4.962 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.91 0.065 0.013 0.006 
Estimated 
survivor 
function 0.09 0.025 0.012 0.006 
Integrated 
Hazard 
Function 2.408 3.689 4.422 5.116 
_X     
Observed 
proportion 0.811 0.15 0.02 0.01 
Estimated 
survivor 
function 0.189 0.039 0.019 0.009 
Integrated 
Hazard 
Function 1.666 3.244 3.963 4.711 
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 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.818 0.138 0.029 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor 
function 0.182 0.044 0.015 0.008 
Integrated 
Hazard Function 1.704 3.124 4.200 4.828 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.679 0.225 0.059 0.02 
Estimated 
survivor 
function 0.321 0.096 0.037 0.017 
Integrated 
Hazard Function 1.136 2.343 3.297 4.075 
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Table 14.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Complete Sample In Non-Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.797 0.158 0.025 0.008 
F(t) 0.797 0.955 0.98 0.988 
K(t) -0.227 -0.0460 -0.020 -0.012 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.739 0.199 0.04 0.01 
F(t) 0.739 0.938 0.978 0.988 
K(t) -0.302 -0.064 -0.022 -0.012 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.808 0.139 0.03 0.013 
F(t) 0.808 0.947 0.977 0.99 
K(t) -0.213 -0.054 -0.023 -0.010 
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Table 15.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Non-Smokers In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.655 0.15 0.075 0.018 
F(t) 0.655 0.805 0.88 0.898 
K(t) -0.423 -0.217 -0.128 -0.108 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.558 0.238 0.07 0.028 
F(t) 0.558 0.796 0.866 0.894 
K(t) -0.583 -0.228 -0.144 -0.112 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.585 0.230 0.053 0.045 
F(t) 0.585 0.815 0.868 0.913 
K(t) -0.536 -0.204 -0.142 -0.091 
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Table 16.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Light Smokers In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.684 0.200 0.028 0.022 
F(t) 0.684 0.884 0.912 0.934 
K(t) -0.380 -0.123 -0.092 -0.068 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.608 0.222 0.046 0.040 
F(t) 0.608 0.830 0.876 0.916 
K(t) -0.498 -0.186 -0.132 -0.088 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.654 0.206 0.056 0.014 
F(t) 0.654 0.860 0.916 0.93 
K(t) -0.425 -0.151 -0.088 -0.073 
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Table 17.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Moderate Smokers In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.655 0.217 0.050 0.014 
F(t) 0.655 0.872 0.922 0.936 
K(t) -0.423 -0.137 -0.081 -0.066 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.619 0.250 0.067 0.021 
F(t) 0.619 0.869 0.936 0.957 
K(t) -0.480 -0.140 -0.066 -0.044 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.700 0.171 0.053 0.017 
F(t) 0.700 0.871 0.924 0.941 
K(t) -0.357 -0.138 -0.079 -0.061 
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Table 18.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Daily Smokers In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.735 0.188 0.031 0.017 
F(t) 0.735 0.923 0.954 0.971 
K(t) -0.308 -0.080 -0.047 -0.029 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.669 0.229 0.052 0.021 
F(t) 0.669 0.898 0.950 0.971 
K(t) -0.402 -0.108 -0.051 -0.029 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.733 0.187 0.037 0.013 
F(t) 0.733 0.920 0.957 0.970 
K(t) -0.311 -0.083 -0.044 -0.031 
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Table 19.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Non-Smokers In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.615 0.205 0.053 0.065 
F(t) 0.615 0.820 0.873 0.938 
K(t) -0.486 -0.199 -0.136 -0.064 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.565 0.223 0.080 0.040 
F(t) 0.565 0.788 0.868 0.908 
K(t) -0.571 -0.238 -0.142 -0.097 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.590 0.225 0.063 0.040 
F(t) 0.590 0.815 0.878 0.918 
K(t) -0.528 -0.205 -0.130 -0.086 
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Table 20.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Light Smokers In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.668 0.232 0.042 0.022 
F(t) 0.668 0.900 0.942 0.964 
K(t) -0.404 -0.105 -0.060 -0.037 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.646 0.190 0.074 0.030 
F(t) 0.646 0.836 0.910 0.940 
K(t) -0.437 -0.179 -0.094 -0.062 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.664 0.184 0.054 0.024 
F(t) 0.664 0.848 0.902 0.926 
K(t) -0.410 -0.165 -0.103 -0.077 
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Table 21.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Moderate Smokers In Pseudosmoking 
Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.624 0.202 0.057 0.034 
F(t) 0.624 0.826 0.883 0.917 
K(t) -0.472 -0.191 -0.124 -0.087 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.597 0.226 0.067 0.029 
F(t) 0.597 0.823 0.89 0.919 
K(t) -0.516 -0.195 -0.117 -0.085 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.591 0.212 0.072 0.036 
F(t) 0.591 0.803 0.875 0.911 
K(t) -0.526 -0.219 -0.134 -0.093 
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Table 22.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, F(t) and K(t) for Daily Smokers In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.681 0.212 0.04 0.025 
F(t) 0.681 0.893 0.933 0.958 
K(t) -0.384 -0.113 -0.069 -0.043 
O _     
Observed 
proportion 0.621 0.248 0.06 0.023 
F(t) 0.621 0.869 0.929 0.952 
K(t) -0.476 -0.140 -0.074 -0.049 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.662 0.204 0.048 0.033 
F(t) 0.662 0.866 0.914 0.947 
K(t) -0.413 -0.144 -0.090 -0.055 
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Table 23.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Light Smokers/Low Co-Users In No Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.900 0.090 0.010 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.100 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.303 4.605 4.605 4.605 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.890 0.080 0.010 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.110 0.030 0.020 0.010 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.207 3.507 3.912 4.605 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.890 0.080 0.010 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.110 0.030 0.020 0.010 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.207 3.507 3.912 4.605 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.770 0.180 0.050 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.230 0.050 0.000 0.000 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.470 2.996 2.996 2.996 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.630 0.180 0.110 0.050 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.370 0.190 0.080 0.030 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.994 1.661 2.526 3.507 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.780 0.160 0.030 0.020 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.220 0.060 0.030 0.010 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.514 2.813 3.507 4.605 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.730 0.190 0.060 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.270 0.080 0.020 0.010 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.309 2.526 3.912 4.605 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.780 0.130 0.040 0.030 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.220 0.090 0.050 0.020 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.514 2.408 2.996 3.912 
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Table 24.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Light Smokers/Low Co-Users In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.800 0.120 0.000 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.200 0.080 0.080 0.070 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.609 2.526 2.526 2.659 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.160 0.040 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.090 0.050 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 2.408 2.996 2.996 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.700 0.200 0.010 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.300 0.100 0.090 0.080 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 2.303 2.408 2.526 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.700 0.180 0.050 0.020 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.300 0.120 0.070 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 2.120 2.659 2.996 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.600 0.250 0.050 0.060 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.400 0.150 0.100 0.040 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.916 1.897 2.303 3.219 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.720 0.160 0.040 0.020 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.280 0.120 0.080 0.060 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.273 2.120 2.526 2.813 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.640 0.220 0.060 0.030 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.360 0.140 0.080 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.022 1.966 2.526 2.996 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.640 0.220 0.060 0.030 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.360 0.140 0.080 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.022 1.966 2.526 2.996 
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Table 25.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Light Smokers/Low Co-Users In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.720 0.140 0.040 0.040 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.280 0.140 0.100 0.060 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.273 1.966 2.303 2.813 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.700 0.110 0.070 0.070 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.300 0.190 0.120 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 1.661 2.120 2.996 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.700 0.160 0.060 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.300 0.140 0.080 0.070 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 1.966 2.526 2.659 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.730 0.190 0.030 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.270 0.080 0.050 0.040 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.309 2.526 2.996 3.219 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.510 0.280 0.110 0.050 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.490 0.210 0.100 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.713 1.561 2.303 2.996 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.720 0.180 0.040 0.020 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.280 0.100 0.060 0.040 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.273 2.303 2.813 3.219 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.660 0.170 0.070 0.030 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.340 0.170 0.100 0.070 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.079 1.772 2.303 2.659 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.660 0.190 0.060 0.030 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.340 0.150 0.090 0.060 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.079 1.897 2.408 2.813 
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Table 26.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Light Smokers/High Co-Users In No Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.937 0.050 0.005 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.063 0.013 0.008 0.008 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.765 4.343 4.828 4.828 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.929 0.058 0.008 0.003 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.071 0.013 0.005 0.002 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.645 4.343 5.298 6.215 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.834 0.142 0.013 0.005 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.166 0.024 0.011 0.006 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.796 3.730 4.510 5.116 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.868 0.106 0.013 0.003 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.132 0.026 0.013 0.010 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.025 3.650 4.343 4.605 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.663 0.266 0.053 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.337 0.071 0.018 0.010 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.088 2.645 4.017 4.605 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.837 0.134 0.021 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.163 0.029 0.008 0.008 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.814 3.540 4.828 4.828 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.203 0.026 0.005 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.047 0.021 0.016 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 3.058 3.863 4.135 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.868 0.105 0.013 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.132 0.027 0.014 0.006 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.025 3.612 4.269 5.116 
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Table 27. 
  
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Light Smokers/High Co-Users In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 
0.721 
 0.147 0.050 0.021 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.279 0.132 0.082 0.061 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.277 2.025 2.501 2.797 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.739 0.132 0.032 0.016 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.261 0.129 0.097 0.081 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.343 2.048 2.333 2.513 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.684 0.171 0.058 0.024 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.316 0.145 0.087 0.063 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.152 1.931 2.442 2.765 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.742 0.126 0.032 0.042 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.258 0.132 0.100 0.058 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.355 2.025 2.303 2.847 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.534 0.253 0.095 0.050 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.466 0.213 0.118 0.068 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.764 1.546 2.137 2.688 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.702 0.203 0.024 0.016 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.298 0.095 0.071 0.055 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.211 2.354 2.645 2.900 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.639 0.218 0.045 0.029 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.361 0.143 0.098 0.069 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.019 1.945 2.323 2.674 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.671 0.208 0.050 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.329 0.121 0.071 0.063 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.112 2.112 2.645 2.765 
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Table 28.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Light Smokers/High Co-Users In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.776 0.124 0.042 0.021 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.224 0.100 0.058 0.037 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.496 2.303 2.847 3.297 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.766 0.116 0.039 0.032 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.234 0.118 0.079 0.047 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.452 2.137 2.538 3.058 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.732 0.158 0.034 0.026 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.268 0.110 0.076 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.317 2.207 2.577 2.996 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.728 0.137 0.071 0.021 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.272 0.135 0.064 0.043 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.302 2.002 2.749 3.147 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.584 0.234 0.068 0.039 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.416 0.182 0.114 0.075 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.877 1.704 2.172 2.590 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.703 0.186 0.030 0.014 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.297 0.111 0.081 0.067 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.214 2.198 2.513 2.703 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.647 0.205 0.068 0.032 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.353 0.148 0.080 0.048 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.041 1.911 2.526 3.037 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.682 0.176 0.047 0.021 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.318 0.142 0.095 0.074 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.146 1.952 2.354 2.604 
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Table 29.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Moderate Smokers/Low Co-Users In No Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.895 0.081 0.010 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.105 0.024 0.014 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.254 3.730 4.269 4.962 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.912 0.067 0.007 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.088 0.021 0.014 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.430 3.863 4.269 4.962 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.814 0.148 0.024 0.012 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.186 0.038 0.014 0.002 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.682 3.270 4.269 6.215 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.814 0.143 0.026 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.186 0.043 0.017 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.682 3.147 4.075 4.962 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.757 0.164 0.055 0.012 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.243 0.079 0.024 0.012 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.415 2.538 3.730 4.423 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.752 0.200 0.021 0.014 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.248 0.048 0.027 0.013 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.394 3.037 3.612 4.343 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.717 0.214 0.050 0.005 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.283 0.069 0.019 0.014 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.262 2.674 3.963 4.269 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.774 0.195 0.019 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.226 0.031 0.012 0.005 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.487 3.474 4.423 5.298 
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Table 30. 
  
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Moderate Smokers/Low Co-Users In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.798 0.129 0.021 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.202 0.073 0.052 0.035 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.599 2.617 2.957 3.352 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.757 0.140 0.040 0.014 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.243 0.103 0.063 0.049 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.415 2.273 2.765 3.016 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.698 0.198 0.036 0.012 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.302 0.104 0.068 0.056 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.197 2.263 2.688 2.882 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.719 0.155 0.071 0.031 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.281 0.126 0.055 0.024 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.269 2.071 2.900 3.730 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.598 0.243 0.067 0.048 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.402 0.159 0.092 0.044 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.911 1.839 2.386 3.124 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.660 0.231 0.050 0.012 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.340 0.109 0.059 0.047 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.079 2.216 2.830 3.058 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.595 0.264 0.062 0.029 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.405 0.141 0.079 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.904 1.959 2.538 2.996 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.717 0.183 0.050 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.283 0.100 0.050 0.040 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.262 2.303 2.996 3.219 
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Table 31.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Moderate/Low Co-Users In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.764 0.145 0.026 0.019 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.236 0.091 0.065 0.046 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.444 2.397 2.733 3.079 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.738 0.117 0.045 0.029 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.262 0.145 0.100 0.071 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.339 1.931 2.303 2.645 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.664 0.202 0.050 0.033 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.336 0.134 0.084 0.051 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.091 2.010 2.477 2.976 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.640 0.198 0.064 0.036 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.360 0.162 0.098 0.062 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.022 1.820 2.323 2.781 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.550 0.245 0.071 0.048 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.450 0.205 0.134 0.086 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.799 1.585 2.010 2.453 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.581 0.250 0.067 0.024 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.419 0.169 0.102 0.078 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.870 1.778 2.283 2.551 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.605 0.238 0.067 0.026 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.395 0.157 0.090 0.064 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.929 1.852 2.408 2.749 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.593 0.214 0.081 0.036 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.407 0.193 0.112 0.076 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.899 1.645 2.189 2.577 
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Table 32. 
  
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Daily Smokers/Low Co-Users In No Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.898 0.090 0.005 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.102 0.012 0.007 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.283 4.423 4.962 4.962 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.912 0.062 0.012 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.088 0.026 0.014 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.430 3.650 4.269 4.962 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.833 0.143 0.012 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.167 0.024 0.012 0.005 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.790 3.730 4.423 5.298 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.800 0.169 0.017 0.007 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.200 0.031 0.014 0.007 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.609 3.474 4.269 4.962 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.660 0.250 0.060 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.340 0.090 0.030 0.013 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.079 2.408 3.507 4.343 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.807 0.160 0.024 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.193 0.033 0.009 0.009 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.645 3.411 4.711 4.711 
    
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.721 0.217 0.043 0.005 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.279 0.062 0.019 0.014 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.277 2.781 3.963 4.269 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.829 0.119 0.029 0.014 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.171 0.052 0.023 0.009 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.766 2.957 3.772 4.711 
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Table 33.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Daily Smokers/Low Co-Users In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.831 0.107 0.033 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.169 0.062 0.029 0.019 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.778 2.781 3.540 3.963 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.826 0.129 0.021 0.005 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.174 0.045 0.024 0.019 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.749 3.101 3.730 3.963 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.724 0.171 0.045 0.036 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.276 0.105 0.060 0.024 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.287 2.254 2.813 3.730 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.752 0.160 0.040 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.248 0.088 0.048 0.031 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.394 2.430 3.037 3.474 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.562 0.290 0.071 0.031 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.438 0.148 0.077 0.046 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.826 1.911 2.564 3.079 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.710 0.207 0.029 0.021 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.290 0.083 0.054 0.033 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.238 2.489 2.919 3.411 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.631 0.255 0.060 0.024 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.369 0.114 0.054 0.030 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.997 2.172 2.919 3.507 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.724 0.205 0.026 0.014 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.276 0.071 0.045 0.031 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.287 2.645 3.101 3.474 
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Table 34.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Daily Smokers/Low Co-Users In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.738 0.167 0.031 0.010 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.262 0.095 0.064 0.054 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.339 2.354 2.749 2.919 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.719 0.143 0.052 0.024 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.281 0.138 0.086 0.062 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.269 1.981 2.453 2.781 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.662 0.236 0.050 0.029 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.338 0.102 0.052 0.023 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.085 2.283 2.957 3.772 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.705 0.183 0.043 0.014 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.295 0.112 0.069 0.055 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.221 2.189 2.674 2.900 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.564 0.238 0.102 0.043 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.436 0.198 0.096 0.053 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.830 1.619 2.343 2.937 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.657 0.231 0.045 0.026 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.343 0.112 0.067 0.041 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.070 2.189 2.703 3.194 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.602 0.262 0.069 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.398 0.136 0.067 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.921 1.995 2.703 2.996 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.655 0.205 0.060 0.019 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.345 0.140 0.080 0.061 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.064 1.966 2.526 2.797 
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Table 35.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Moderate and Daily Smokers/High Co-Users In No Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.917 0.083 0.000 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.489 2.489 2.489 2.489 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.925 0.050 0.025 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.075 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.590 3.689 3.689 3.689 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.867 0.108 0.017 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.133 0.025 0.008 0.000 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 2.017 3.689 4.828 4.828 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.817 0.158 0.025 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.183 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.698 3.689 3.689 3.689 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.658 0.250 0.050 0.025 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.342 0.092 0.042 0.017 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.073 2.386 3.170 4.075 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.158 0.067 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.092 0.025 0.017 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 2.386 3.689 4.075 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.808 0.133 0.042 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.192 0.059 0.017 0.009 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.650 2.830 4.075 4.711 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.808 0.125 0.058 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.192 0.067 0.009 0.001 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.650 2.703 4.711 6.908 
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Table 36.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Moderate and Daily Smokers/High Co-Users In Smoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.833 0.075 0.017 0.042 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.167 0.092 0.075 0.033 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.790 2.386 2.590 3.411 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.108 0.058 0.080 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.142 0.084 0.004 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 1.952 2.477 5.521 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.167 0.050 0.000 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.083 0.033 0.033 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 2.489 3.411 3.411 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.767 0.117 0.025 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.233 0.116 0.091 0.074 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.457 2.154 2.397 2.604 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.625 0.192 0.067 0.042 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.375 0.183 0.116 0.074 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.981 1.698 2.154 2.604 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.717 0.133 0.050 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.283 0.150 0.100 0.092 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.262 1.897 2.303 2.386 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.733 0.142 0.067 0.033 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.267 0.125 0.058 0.025 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.321 2.079 2.847 3.689 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.717 0.142 0.033 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.283 0.141 0.108 0.091 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.262 1.959 2.226 2.397 
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Table 37.  
 
Observed Bin Proportions, Estimated Survivor Functions and Integrated Hazard 
Functions for Moderate and Daily Smokers/High Co-Users In Pseudosmoking Condition 
 0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
XX     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.167 0.008 0.008 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.083 0.075 0.067 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 2.489 2.590 2.703 
X _     
Observed 
proportion 0.733 0.092 0.050 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.267 0.175 0.125 0.108 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.321 1.743 2.079 2.226 
_ X     
Observed 
proportion 0.700 0.150 0.033 0.017 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.300 0.150 0.117 0.100 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.204 1.897 2.146 2.303 
XO     
Observed 
proportion 0.683 0.142 0.058 0.033 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.317 0.175 0.117 0.084 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.149 1.743 2.146 2.477 
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0-400 ms 400-600 ms 600-800 ms 800-1000 ms 
OX     
Observed 
proportion 0.658 0.217 0.050 0.025 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.342 0.125 0.075 0.050 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.073 2.079 2.590 2.996 
OO     
Observed 
proportion 0.750 0.100 0.033 0.058 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.250 0.150 0.117 0.059 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.386 1.897 2.146 2.830 
     
O_     
Observed 
proportion 0.683 0.167 0.033 0.025 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.317 0.150 0.117 0.092 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 1.149 1.897 2.146 2.386 
_O     
Observed 
proportion 0.617 0.225 0.058 0.025 
Estimated 
survivor function 0.383 0.158 0.100 0.075 
Integrated Hazard 
Function 0.960 1.845 2.303 2.590 
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